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     This thesis employs a poststructuralist framework to consider the possibilities for agency 
and resistance in consumer capitalism.  The argument begins with an examination of figures 
who emerged in nineteenth century psychiatric discourses, and the roles that those figures 
play in poststructural and postmodern critiques of psychoanalysis and psychiatry, specifically 
in the work of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. I then argue that David 
Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest presents us with a new figure—the addict. My reading of 
Wallace is informed by poststructuralist critiques of psychiatric power and by Wallace’s own 
affinity for the fiction of Franz Kafka. I argue that the addict is a configuration of subjectivity 
that emerges under consumer capitalism, and through a Deleuzian reading of Infinite Jest, I 
prove that the addict is both a complicit and resistant figure, who personifies the grounds for 
human agency under consumer capital. 
Keywords 
Poststructuralism, postmodernism, David Foster Wallace, Kafka, Deleuze, Guattari, 
Foucault, subjectivity, consumer capitalism, depression, anhedonia, addiction, Infinite Jest  
Summary for Lay Audience 
       Much poststructural and postmodern thought has focused on the construction of the 
subject, particularly on the configuration of regimes of knowledge and power that have 
historically defined subjectivity. Following the example of poststructual and postmodern 
thought, my thesis is an examination of the figures of madness who emerged in nineteenth 




poststructuralist thought. I demonstrate that these figures—the depressive, manic-depressive 
and schizophrenic—and the therapeutic regimes that spring up around them are inherently 
political. Theorists such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue 
specifically that these figures are symptomatic of the fragmented subjectivity that emerges 
under consumer capitalism.  In texts such as Madness and Civilization and Anti-Oedipus, 
they argue that the confluence of certain forces—therapeutic regimes, particularly 
psychoanalysis and capitalism—have coalesced around and actually realize their full, 
despotic potential in the repression of the contemporary subject. However, wherever there is 
oppression, resistance is also possible.  Drawing upon David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest, I 
argue that there is a fourth figure, the figure of the addict, who embodies these circulations of 
power and, in many ways, is the ideal subject of consumer capitalism, but who is also a 
figure of resistance. Through a Deleuzian reading of Wallace’s text, I argue that the addict is 
both a subject who is formed by the multiplicity of forces beyond their control but who 
nonetheless finds agency in the world-building nature of addiction. I also examine Wallace’s 
affinity for Kafka’s literature, particularly The Metamorphosis, and his appropriation of 
Kafka’s Gregor Samsa through the character of Hal Incandenza in Infinite Jest.  For Wallace, 
I argue, Kafka’s narrative serves as an example that enables the late postmodernist writer to 
construct the addict as the logical response to the dominance of anhedonia and depression 
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Chapter 1  
1. Critique of Pure Madness 
         Much twentieth-century thought might be defined by its suspicion of the privileging 
of reason. Contemporary theory, in particular, has shown a keen interest in figures of 
madness, as those who sit outside regimes of rationality and truth. Postmodernist and 
poststructuralist writers and theoreticians have often recognized that there is both a 
symptomatic configuration and a potential for resistance in figures of madness and the 
therapeutic subject.  For poststructuralists, the figures of various mental illnesses have 
also been useful for theorizing the way that language and capitalism generate the political 
horizons of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Perhaps the most well-
known of these figures is the schizophrenic in the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari. My thesis follows from their example; however, in addition to the 
schizophrenic, I would like to consider the depressive and manic-depressive, two 
recurrent figures in the work of Foucault and in the discourse of twentieth century 
psychiatry. In this thesis, I would also like to expand upon the concepts of the depressive, 
manic-depressive and schizophrenic to include a new figure, that of the addict, who is 
perhaps best represented in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest. 
        On February 6, 1974, Michel Foucault delivered the twelfth lecture in his 1973-74 
seminar at the Collège de France, a seminar that would subsequently be published under 
the title, Psychiatric Power. In this lecture, Foucault describes the dynamic between 
Jean-Martin Charcot, the nineteenth-century neurologist and professor, and the hysterics 
he worked with at Salpêtrière. Foucault argues that because Charcot’s research attempted 
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to classify hysteria as a neurological illness, the trauma that each hysteric appears to have 
suffered had to be treated as though it were a physical symptom divorced from any non-
biological cause (Foucault, Psychiatric 317-18). As Foucault recounts in his lectures, 
many of the hysterics were female patients whose fits involved the recollection of sexual 
violence; notes from the case files of patients such as Genviève corroborate this fact 
(Psychiatric 322). However, Charcot never admitted that sexual trauma was one of the 
root causes. As Foucault explains, “if one really wanted to succeed in demonstrating 
hysteria was a genuine illness, if one absolutely wanted to make it work within the 
system of differential diagnosis, if one did not want its status as illness to be challenged, 
then it had to be entirely shorn of that disqualifying element…sexuality” (Psychiatric 
321). The hysteric became an object of knowledge because their body was marked by 
trauma; however, the cause and content of that trauma was of no interest to neurologists. 
Trauma was noteworthy only to the extent that it appeared to leave a lesion or physical 
mark on the brain. Trauma’s physiological symptoms, rather than their cause, were the 
medical priority.  For Foucault, the hysteric is, to some extent, emblematic of the ways in 
which the psycho-pathological subject, or the subject deemed “mad,” is dominated by 
master discourses that hold the power to define and discredit madness.  
        As Gilles Deleuze similarly observes in another context: 
One thing is rather shocking about books of psychiatry or even psychoanalysis, and 
that is the pervasive duality between what an alleged mental patient says and what 
the doctor reports—between the ‘case’ and the commentary on the case, the analysis 
of the case. It’s logos against pathos: the mental patient is supposed to say 
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something, and the doctor says what it means in terms of symptoms or sense. This 
allows what the patient says to be crushed. It’s hypocritically selective. (Desert 218)   
Here, Deleuze points out that the mad are not allowed to speak directly. Rather, the 
doctor takes what the patient says and uses it to prove a theory. Foucault and Deleuze 
turn to figures of madness because of the way that institutional regimes exploit these 
figures in order to generate a dominant logic and a normative measure of reality. The 
language of symptomology, of differential diagnosis, is one of power. Deleuze argues, 
correctly, that the mad are not listened to. They are a perfect example of the way that the 
subject is constructed by external forces that refuse to allow it to participate in its own 
becoming, forces that pursue their despotic course under the guise of ‘care.’ The 
treatment of mental patients, from the way that they are diagnosed to the way they are 
managed and moved through the systems of medicine, law and capital, exemplifies the 
way in which the subject is caught in and engendered by a multiplicity of systems, and 
that subject, constructed and disciplined by those systems, resides at the core of 
poststructuralist and postmodernist thought.  
1.1. Reality, What? 
As Jean-François Lyotard remarks, “A self does not amount to much, but no self 
is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than 
ever before” (Lyotard 15). The subject is enmeshed within a network of linguistic and 
economic relations that are prior to its existence. However, this is not to say that the 
subject is not important. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “like all other breaks, the 
subjective break is not at all an indication of a lack or need, but on the contrary, a share 
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that falls to the subject as a part of a whole, income that comes its way as something left 
over” (Anti-Oedipus 41). By using the economic metaphor of income, Deleuze and 
Guattari emphasize that the network that forges the subject is also productive and creates 
things of value. The subject, in their terms, may be destabilized and re-arranged, but the 
celebrated fragmentation of the subject, or the disappearance of the unitary subject, 
should not be thought in terms of a loss. In other words, the fragmentation of the subject 
does not dimmish the crucial importance of the category of the subject.  
The fragmented subject that figures so prominently in poststructural critique is 
also central to the representational field of postmodern narrative and culture. Linda 
Hutcheon, for example, asserts that the postmodern critique of representation can best be 
understood as a way of demonstrating that notions like truth and tradition are conveyed 
through a series of images and motifs, which can be reconfigured and called into 
question. She writes, “postmodernism reveals a desire to understand present culture as the 
product of previous representations” (Hutcheon 55).  Prominent among previous notions 
and representations is the traditional unified subject, which is often the object of 
postmodern representational subversion.1    
 
1 Postmodernism is “a periodizing concept whose function is to correlate the emergence of new formal 
features in culture with the emergence of a new type of social life and a new economic order—what is often 
euphemistically called post-industrial or consumer society” (Jameson 3). Many, such as Jameson, would 
argue that postmodernism is, in a sense, in the past. Jameson is actually someone who believes that 
postmodernism does not belong to the past, and persists with the term, even though he recognizes that not 
everyone shares his view.  However, many of the preoccupations that fueled the aesthetic of 
postmodernism, such as the construction of subjectivity, duplicity and representation continue to inform 
contemporary theory.  
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        It is this fragmentation of the subject, and the struggle to accurately represent it, that 
bolsters Hutcheon’s claim that the political dimensions of postmodernism lie in its 
interest in representations of post-industrial life, both in high art and low commodified 
forms. Hutcheon argues that by self-consciously playing with the conventions of 
representation, postmodernism aims to interrogate the past and to displace the meta-
structures that were previously received as given and self-evident truths (Hutcheon 1-2).  
In taking up the question of representation, postmodernism, Hutcheon asserts, is making 
a political claim that things can be different.   
        This line of reasoning is not completely satisfactory for those who believe that 
postmodernism is not adequately subversive, though the disappointment with the 
postmodern refusal or inability to do away with traditional narratives is arguably 
misplaced.  Hutcheon writes that of all its descriptors—subversive, self-reflexive, self-
duplicitous, self-undermining—the highest ethic of postmodernism is a “commitment to 
doubleness” (Hutcheon 1). This duplicity gives it the strategic advantage of being able to 
critique, well, everything—any image in the contemporary lexicon can be subverted or 
recapitulated. For Hutcheon, postmodernism reaches its highest critical function when it 
“de-naturalizes” given images that were held to be above critique or beneath 
consideration of socio-political intrigue (42). Many would still argue that de-
naturalization is not a satisfying political stance, especially when postmodernism’s main 
claim is that everything is constructed. However, the question of representation and the 
assembly of images are critical in a society that is defined, not just by its own 
consumption, but by how it makes sense of consumption. Postmodern discourses on 
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representation challenge the way that the subject understands itself within the context of a 
consumer society through a complicitous critique of both the subject and the social field.   
1.2. Poststructuralism, Postmodernism and Madness 
Central to the postmodern critique of representation is its critique of the category of 
the subject, a critique that is informed, in part, by theoretical interrogations of the 
discourse and practice of psychoanalysis. As Mark Fisher observes, “in the 1960s and 
1970s, radical theory and politics…coalesced around extreme mental conditions such as 
schizophrenia, arguing, for instance, that madness was not a natural, but a political, 
category” (Realism 19). In poststructural thought, as I have already suggested, Foucault’s 
work is fundamental to this project, as is the work of Deleuze and Guattari.  In broadest 
terms, for Foucault, the principal charge to be laid at the door of the therapeutic regime is 
that it doesn’t listen to the mad. Rather, it seeks to exploit madness as a means of 
legitimizing discourses of civilization, meaning and rationality, and it tries to “push” the 
“non-being of madness” out of discourse by forcing the mad to recognize that they are 
the error, the ones who need to be corrected (Foucault, Madness 187). For Foucault, 
madness is a discourse that exists alongside, and is the necessary precondition for, reason. 
He argues that psychiatric power converts madness into mental illness—that is, the 
medicalization of madness de-fangs it. Madness is an untamed force that moves through 
the social field, while mental illness is made up of clinical categories.     
        To put it another way, psychiatric power operates on a logic of waiting for the 
barbarians. It cautions us that madness is a force that must be contained. For psychiatric 
power, madness is both denigrated as a failure to understand reality correctly and closely 
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watched for its dangerous potential to overthrow reason.  Madness has no terminus and 
can only be managed through a constant regime; there is no ‘cure.’ Yet, madness also 
needs to be managed so that it can be maintained; after all, psychiatric power has no 
purpose if it has no one to treat.  More broadly, we might argue that civilization requires 
madness for its legitimation and produces mental illness as its by-product. Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “our society produces schizos the same way it produces Prell shampoo or 
Ford cars, the only difference being that the schizos are not salable” (Anti-Oedipus 245). 
The chief distinction between a product and a by-product is that the former is intended, 
and the latter is secondary. A society that organizes itself around repression necessarily 
reproduces the madness that it tries to suppress. But “why does [capitalism] confine its 
madmen and madwomen instead of seeing them as its own heroes and heroines, its own 
fulfilment?” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 245). Capitalism thrives on discord, but 
it is not, itself, madness. Rather, we might say that madness is the by-product of living 
under capitalism.  The system produces madness, and it uses repression as a way to 
control and leverage its reproduction, even though madness is dangerous to the system 
itself.  
          However, not everyone has tried to silence madness. The one nice thing Foucault 
says about Freud is that he at least tried to speak to madness directly (Madness 198). 
Unlike his Enlightenment forebears, Freud doesn’t discount the idea that the mad could 
have something comprehensible to say. However, psychoanalysis purposefully 
misinterprets the mad, in the sense that it projects itself onto the productions of the 
unconscious.  While quoting Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari explain,   
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Insofar as psychoanalysis cloaks insanity in the mantle of a ‘parental complex,’ and 
regards the patterns of self-punishment resulting from Oedipus as a confession of 
guilt, its theories are not at all radical or innovative. On the contrary: it is 
completing the task begun by nineteenth-century psychology, namely, to develop a 
moralized, familial discourse of mental pathology, linking madness to the ‘half-
real, half-imaginary dialectic of the Family,’ deciphering within it ‘the unending 
attempt to murder the father,’ ‘the dull thud of instincts hammering at the solidity 
of the family as an institution and at its most archaic symbols.’ (Foucault qtd. in 
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 50) 
 Deleuze and Guattari argue that not only does psychoanalysis deliberately mishear 
madness, it is directly responsible for perfecting the function of repression under 
capitalism. They write about the process of oedipalization: the way that we are trained to 
identify and function as if Oedipus were real. The core function of oedipalization is that 
the subject comes to understand that their desire, through language, is predicated on lack. 
Oedipus is afraid of becoming even less if his father castrates him for bedding his mother.  
For the subject, this means that desire is a longing that cannot be fulfilled, for satisfaction 
would cause irreparable psychic harm. However, lack still generates tension because the 
entire theory of Oedipus relies on the assumption that what one wants most is something 
that is unattainable. This inability to obtain the object of one’s desire is a constant source 
of psychic distress. Repression capitalizes on this tension by structuring the desire of the 
subject as one that goes without fulfillment, as if desire were a void.  
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       While psychoanalysis would claim that the Oedipal triangle is transhistorical, it 
emerged as a therapeutic concept only with the arrival of psychoanalysis at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The Oedipal triangle defines the subject in terms of a specific notion 
of the family, in relation to the Mother and the Father, and through a narrative in which 
the subject experiences the possibility of both fulfilment and castration. The logical 
fallout of this triangulation is that the family is both the guardian against and at fault for 
stoking madness (Foucault, Psychiatric 97).  For Freud, Oedipus presents the story of a 
son who, torn between his desire for his mother and fear of his father, is forced into 
accepting that he will never be permitted to have the thing that he wants. The family is 
“haunted by mythical figures,” and this haunting creates a superficial coherence for the 
origin of the subject and the psychic unrest that is, by and large, inflicted and necessitated 
by our way of living (Foucault, Madness 117). By entrenching the theatre of the family 
within myth—stories with ancient and forgotten origins—an illusion of permanence is 
created. Suddenly, it is perfectly reasonable to accept the ideas that the unconscious, 
while unknowable, can become comprehensible under a very specific reading, and that all 
human motivations can become coherent and reasonable, no matter how selfish, 
perverted or convoluted. The incest taboo, for example, is misunderstood as given and 
absolute. If it were an innate, biological function, there would be no need for a law 
against it. With the acceptance of the incest taboo, the most sacred and intuitive laws 
must be reinforced by a state power.  
       This conversion process from unstable force to static being is not confined to 
madness. For Foucault, this is, in fact, the method by which subjectivity is created; the 
subject is a flashpoint through which multiple powers merge and flow. The subject is 
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constituted by these flows, and what appears to be a stable formation is infinitely more 
flexible than it is given credit for. The enigmatic powers-that-be are machines that require 
a clean circuit through which to run, and subjectivity is one of those tracks. In his study 
of the asylum and psychiatric power, Foucault examines the way that the production of 
reason necessitates the negation of madness.  
1.3. Madness for Civilization 
       In Madness and Civilization, Foucault provides several arguments, all of which 
expand upon the above idea. The first is that Enlightenment discourses produced the 
figure of the madman as an object of knowledge. These discourses separated madness 
from reason, and thoroughly devalued madness and the mad subject, for “there appeared 
to be a special modulation which concerned madness proper, and was addressed to those 
called, without exact semantic distinction, insane, alienated, deranged, demented, 
extravagant” (Foucault, Madness 66). Madness was thrown into the same category as 
non-being and the profane—that is, negations that served to distinguish and to define 
structural features essential to modern civilization. In this sense, madness can be 
understood as a spectre, a ghost that, despite being rebuffed and negated, is nonetheless 
present in its absence. Through its negation, in part, rationality and civilization affirm 
their power and necessity.  
      Foucault also argues that the emergence of psychiatry was really about the creation of 
a human science. Rendered the object of knowledge, the subject would be made to 
disclose their truth to doctors, in the hopes that psychiatry could reveal something about 
them that they could not. Foucault recounts the case of a melancholic who believed he 
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had no head. He writes that the doctor treated the patient by “entering into the delirium, 
[agreeing] at the sufferer’s request to fill up this space and placed upon his head a great 
ball of lead” (Madness 190). Upon experiencing discomfort, the patient was forced to 
admit that, indeed, he had a head instead of a void where it ought to be. Foucault writes, 
“the exchange of non-being with itself is carried out in this ingenious play: the non-being 
of delirium is turned against the being of illness and suppresses it by the simple fact that 
it is driven out of the delirium by dramatic representation” (Madness 191). In this 
example, we see madness is engaged by participating in its own negation. Quite literally, 
in this case, “the non-being of madness, the inanity of error, was forced to yield, finally, 
to this pressure of the truth” (Madness 187). In early cognitive treatments for madness, 
the sign of ‘remission’ is that the mad come to understand themselves as such. This is 
achieved “not by treating the false judgment, by trying to correct it or dismiss it by 
demonstration, but rather by dressing up and manipulating reality [so it] is placed on the 
same level, as it were, as the delirium” (Foucault, Psychiatric 131). The doctor takes a 
hold of reality and pins the madman on all sides, or, in other words, the psychiatrist 
claims to represent “the surplus-power of reality inasmuch as I possess, by myself and 
definitively, something that is the truth in relation to madness” (Foucault, Madness 134).  
Reason, in this practice, does not appeal to itself as reason; rather, it presents itself as 
truth. 
       In the opening pages of Madness and Civilization Foucault points out that in the 
Middle Ages, the mad in urban centres would be rounded up, placed together on boats 
and sent to other cities.  This served both a practical and spiritual purpose: the mad were 
no longer in their original host city, but the madman was also sent on a symbolic journey, 
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for “navigation delivers man to the uncertainty of fate; on water, each of us is in the 
hands of his own destiny” (Foucault, Madness 11). When moving over water, the mad 
were not simply driven from a city, but embarked on an unending journey, for every port 
city would eventually place them on another boat. In this way, they each became “the 
prisoner of the passage” (Madness 11). Unlike Odysseus, who was on a journey to 
understand his place in the cosmos, the mad were—and are—on a journey of perpetual 
displacement.  
1.4. Madmen: Depressed or Manic 
        However, the madman at the beginning of Madness and Civilization is very different 
from the one we encounter at the end of the book. The madman is transformed through 
psychiatric discourses.  Psychiatric power will vivisect the mad for parts, classifying 
illnesses and stealing that which gave madness its ability to traverse worlds—its non-
reason is stolen from it. While it is possible to read Madness and Civilization as an 
attempt on the part of Foucault to restore the non-reason of madness, that would be a 
mistake. We cannot go back and return that which was taken away. Rather, Foucault 
attempts to create a discourse around madness that does not force it to submit to reason. 
He uses madness to interrogate the assumptions of reason. To do this, Foucault refers to 
specific cases and illnesses to demonstrate the ways that reason relies on non-reason for 
definition. I would like to focus on two specific figures in his work: those of the manic-
depressive and the depressive.  
       The figures of the manic-depressive and the depressive go by several names 
throughout Foucault’s oeuvre, but for the purposes of this thesis, I will simply employ the 
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names “depressive” and “manic-depressive.” They are twin figures, who have long been 
understood to exist on the same spectrum, produced by illnesses that affect the mood of 
the patient (Foucault, Madness 125). Moods are an affective state which, unlike 
emotions, are not the result of a specific stimulus. Mood disorders are typically judged 
both on the basis of how the patient feels and on how the patient is perceived by others—
in this instance, doctors. In the case of mania and depression, patients are often treated 
with the same spectrum of medications, and there is frequent cross-treatment with 
different medications. For example, a manic-depressive may be treated with an 
antidepressant in conjunction with a mood stabilizer, while a depressive may be treated 
with an antipsychotic. The reason these conditions receive similar treatment is that mania 
and depression exist on the same spectrum. Both are uncanny to behold, in that they 
produce a comic enlargement of certain qualities of the patient. The features of the 
depressive may remain inert and flattened, while, when in the throes of mania, the manic-
depressive may speak quickly and is unable to sit still. The depressive and manic-
depressive, when in an episode, are both like themselves, but not. They still know who 
they are, but they are nonetheless transformed. 
       Mood disorders are not a break with reality. While there undoubtedly is “an idea 
dear to traditional psychiatry that madness is fundamentally linked to a loss of reality,” 
the depressive and the manic-depressive do not lose touch with reality (Deleuze and 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 123). Rather, they become keenly aware of reality.  Mania and 
depression alter the patient, and affect impacts the way reality is perceived, but the 
depressive and manic-depressive are still capable of reasoning. Foucault writes, “the 
mind of the melancholic is entirely occupied with reflection, so that his imagination 
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remains at leisure and in repose; the maniac’s imagination, on the contrary, is occupied 
by a perpetual influx of impetuous thoughts” (Madness 125).  The locus of their illnesses 
are found in the way that they think and put ideas together. However, they cannot hide 
the moods that give rise to the productive apparatus of their mind. Depressives and 
manic-depressives both deal with restlessness, impatience, frustration and an inability to 
disguise their moods from others. They both build worlds, yet, unlike the schizophrenic, 
they can be told that they are insane, and, furthermore, the depressive and manic-
depressive can believe that they are, indeed, crazy. The depressive and manic-depressive 
are more receptive to therapeutic and pharmaceutical treatment than the Deleuzian 
schizophrenic, who will be discussed later in this chapter. They can lie down on Freud’s 
couch and nod: ‘Yes, I really am sick.’ In that way, they can be read as finally 
submissive, open to correction, and distant from what might be understood as the 
revolutionary threat of madness.   
       The psychiatric establishment, however, appears to believe otherwise. Both the 
depressive and manic-depressive are considered difficult to treat—a difficulty 
compounded by the fluctuating moods that characterize these conditions—justifying the 
sometimes cruel treatment instituted in the name of psychiatric reason. The instability 
presented by the manic-depressive is considered to be especially dangerous. Left 
untreated, “the savage danger of madness is related to the danger of the passions and to 
their fatal concatenation” (Foucault, Madness 85).  Furthermore, the behaviours that are 
watched for are ones that revolve around consumption: appetite, money, sexuality and 
substance use (Miklowitz 27). The volatility of mania lies in the way that it floods the 
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subject, demanding that the subject react to its appetites without delay or considerations 
for limits.   
      The treatment of mania, or excitation, became a major concern in the early years of 
materialist psychiatry (de Sutter 6). The manic-depressive was considered dangerous 
because, in addition to being followed by the hound of depression, they are haunted by 
the spectre of mania. The defining feature of manic depression is “the capacity to be 
excited” (de Sutter 9). The capacity to become excited without a clear provocation 
constituted a threat for several reasons, but Laurent de Sutter argues that the interest in 
calming down the singular patient was a part of broader political concern around the 
masses.  The root of this thought begins in the manic-depressive. The goal of treatment 
for the manic-depressive is simple: “a manic depressive does not get better; all you can 
do is try to calm them down—make sure, that is, that the excitation affecting them is 
reduced to nothing” (de Sutter 12).  In other words, mania can only be constrained and 
monitored. To control the disease, patients take medications that are designed to bring 
them down, among them lithium, antipsychotics and mood stabilizers.  While depression 
is a key feature of the illness, de Sutter’s manic-depressive is at their most threatening 
when manic; their depression is considered to provide welcome stability.  As he puts it, 
“the only good manic-depressive is a depressive” (de Sutter 12).  The medications used to 
treat the manic-depressive typically have side-effects that range from digestive upset and 
weight gain to anhedonia and akathisia, a loss of libido to anxiety. For side-effects like 
nausea, unless intolerable, patients are advised to wait it out. Moreover, losing one’s 
libido is taken as a given. As risky sexual behaviour and arousal is a feature of mania, 
losing one’s sex drive is a necessary sacrifice in order to control the condition. 
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       Using the figure of the manic-depressive, de Sutter explores the relationship between 
capitalism and narcotics. For de Sutter, the manic-depressive is a more broadly 
representative figure, one who best exemplifies lived experience under what de Sutter 
calls “narcocapitalism,” a lived experience characterized by the willingness of the subject 
to accept intolerable side-effects as a necessary evil in order to get better.  The main 
argument in Narcocapitalism is that the contemporary subject accepts the premise that 
they must give up their desires to achieve political stability, in the way that the manic-
depressive and depressive accept that the cost of achieving clinical stability is one’s 
libido. Psychotropic pharmaceuticals affect the moods and behaviour and are deployed to 
order and stabilize the mind. These drugs include, but are not limited to, mood stabilizers, 
anti-depressants, lithium, and antipsychotics. He argues that under the regime of 
narcocapitalism, these drugs are used to anaesthetize the subject in order to render them 
docile, not to improve their quality of life. In this context, the function of psychiatric 
power is not just to treat the mad, but to anticipate madness before it strikes.  
        By contrast, the figure of the depressive is incredibly difficult to theorize. If mania 
represents the destructive potential of the passions, then depression is that destructive 
force intensified.  According to Thomas Sydenham, “[melancholics] are people who are, 
apart from their complaint, prudent and sensible, and who have extraordinary penetration 
and sagacity. Thus, Aristotle rightly observed that melancholics have more intelligence 
than other men” (qtd. in Foucault, Madness 118).  This is an interesting and recurrent 
theme throughout discourses about depressives: the idea that their misery endows them 
with an ability to see the world as it is. This is, perhaps, the greatest illusion depression 
casts, for “the depressive is always confident about one thing: that he is without illusions” 
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(Fisher, Ghosts 60). The depressive never questions their actual perception of the world, 
because their madness can easily masquerade as sanity.  
      Depressives are described throughout Madness and Civilization as sedate and 
reflective. But as Foucault points out, the melancholic is one of the first figures to have 
their madness attached to the body, specifically through the humours, so that what was 
once an issue of the soul became a physiological pathology (Madness 119).  One would 
think that the physiology of depressives would be of little interest, since they are able to 
present themselves as being a better seer than others, yet depression was one of the first 
mental illnesses to be thought of as connected to the body.   
    However, in the contemporary world, depression is an illness that is regarded in 
existential, rather than physiological, terms.  It is an illness characterized by the radical 
annihilation of being. The depressive is, arguably, the embodiment of non-being itself. 
Depression is inimical to life, and therefore, resists being thought.  Mark Fisher argues, 
for example, “depression is not sadness, not even a state of mind, it is a (neuro) 
philosophical (dis)position” (Ghosts 59).  However, depression is not a belief; the 
depressive does not wake up and consciously decide that depression is the best way of 
apprehending the modern world. Rather, depression makes a slow creep upon the senses. 
In that sense, clinical depression is not a philosophical disposition; it is simply good at 
masquerading as one. Fisher writes, “the depressive experiences himself as walled off 
from the lifeworld, so that his own frozen inner life—an inner death—overwhelms 
everything; at the same time, he experiences himself as evacuated, totally denuded, a 
shell: there is nothing except the inside, and the inside is empty” (Ghosts 59). While the 
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depressive is still in the world, they do not participate in the world as a being. Something 
has been essentially robbed from them.  The depressive can participate in activities that 
are, theoretically, pleasurable, but there is a cognitive dissonance, a lacuna, a gap 
between the thing and the experience of the thing where pleasure should be. Anhedonia, 
the inability to enjoy activities that were once pleasurable, is a side-effect of many 
psychiatric drugs, but it is also one of the key symptoms of depression. In the manic-
depressive, we see a figure whose enjoyment is purposefully muzzled and anaesthetized, 
while in the depressive, the loss of pleasure is one of the more painful symptoms of the 
disease. To add another level of complication, antidepressants, as I have already 
indicated, are notorious for killing the libido, so that even if one starts enjoying some 
pleasurable things again, one will still lose the ability to enjoy sex. Here, the duplicity of 
anhedonia reveals itself, as both a symptom that requires treatment and a side-effect to be 
endured.   
1.5. Anhedonia: Infinite 
        The recurring and connective affect in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest is not 
strictly depression; rather, it is anhedonia— the inability to feel any pleasure. As a 
clinical symptom of depression, anhedonia is a term for the depressed person’s inability 
to enjoy activities that once brought them pleasure.  Being around the people one loves or 
pursuing interests that bring one joy lose not only their charm but are ‘painful’ for the 
depressed person because these things don’t make them feel anything. The depressed 
person is completely numb to the people and things which once brought them joy. This 
same numbness, or anhedonia, is accompanied by a self-awareness of one’s own 
indifference, so that the depressed person is often deeply unnerving to those around them, 
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principally because they do not appear to feel anything.  The depressed still believe in 
things like values and principles, but they cannot feel anything towards them. 
       One of the most memorable characters in Infinite Jest is Kate Gompert, who is 
hospitalized in the novel for multiple suicide attempts (Wallace, Infinite Jest 69). One of 
her observations is that there are two types of depression from which a person can suffer: 
the most common is anhedonia, and the second is the severely painful void of full-blown 
clinical depression. Her description of anhedonia is important here, as it describes its 
affective qualities. Wallace writes, “the anhedonic can still speak about happiness and 
meaning et al., but she has become incapable of feeling anything in them, of 
understanding anything about them, of hoping anything about them, or of believing them 
to exist as anything more than concepts” (693).  In other words, while one can still think 
about and believe in things like meaning, one can do so only at the level of abstraction. 
As Wallace’s narrator further explains, “Kate Gompert’s always thought of this 
anhedonic state as a kind of radical abstracting of everything, a hollowing out of stuff that 
used to have affective content” (693). The anhedonic can think about happiness and 
freedom, but their condition renders those concepts nothing but abstractions.  
       Anhedonia guts principles, values and activities of their pleasure; depression replaces 
numbness with pain. Thus, while anhedonia and severe depression are distinct, they do 
exist on the same affective continuum. For Wallace, “dead-eyed anhedonia is but a 
remora on the ventral flank of the true predator, the Great White Shark of pain” that is 
depression (Infinite Jest 695). He writes this in reference to the central character, Hal, 
who has not yet grown into realizing that anhedonia is only one end of this continuum, 
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which implies that anhedonia grows into depression.  As for Kate Gompert, she resides in 
the belly of this shark. She experiences “it [as] a level of psychic pain wholly 
incompatible with human life as we know it. It is a sense of radical and thoroughgoing 
evil not just as a feature but as the essence of conscious existence” (695). Kate Gompert’s 
depression and suicidal ideation resists any kind of amelioration. She cannot, nor will 
she, find any relief from her suicidal depression. It resists any treatment or therapy, 
forcing Gompert to live with an incomprehensible amount of pain. While anhedonia can 
be theorized, depression resists this impulse because as an affective experience, it 
forecloses upon every other thought or sense but pain. For this reason, while we cannot 
think about the affective reality of anhedonia without thinking of its more extreme 
relation, depression itself cannot be thought. 
       Kate Gompert, who tries to treat her depression through the recreational use of 
cannabis, accurately depicts Fisher’s concept of “depressive hedonia,” as, “an inability to 
do anything except pursue pleasure” (Realism 21-22). The depressive can still pursue 
pleasure and knows what pleasure is, in the abstract way that one can theoretically know 
how to fly a kite.  By contrast, depressive hedonia is similar to anhedonia, in the sense 
that neither results in actual pleasure. Depressive hedonia is a state of consumption that is 
predicated on a futile attempt to feel better, even as one knows that that consumption will 
not get rid of bad feelings. The depressive sets up our relationship to consumerism this 
way: the depressive “unwittingly finds himself in concordance with all the human 
condition…he sees himself as a serial consumer of empty simulations, a junky hooked on 
every kind of deadening high, a meat puppet of the passions” (Fisher, Ghosts 61). The 
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truth that the depressive reveals is the vacant relationship between the subject and the 
consumer.   
1.6. Biopolitics to Psychopolitics 
The depressive moves from being an existential to a political figure when one 
considers the implications of what it means to live in a social field dominated by 
anhedonia. The depressive is not an inherently political figure, so much as the discourses 
that move through them politicize depression. For Foucault, since the eighteenth century 
we have been living in the age of biopolitics, or the political administration of biological 
life. The ontological and existential questions posed in previous political regimes are 
replaced by systems of classification and organization that supplant and dominate by 
“[intervening] to make live” (Foucault, Society 248).  In the regime of biopolitics, the 
wellness of citizens becomes a political imperative. The important thing to remember 
about biopolitics is that it has no goal; it merely works to perpetuate itself. It does not 
look to cure—it aims to maintain control. Its creation and organization of figures within 
medical discourses is designed for the purpose of creating subjects to be administrated.  
Foucault often notes that the function of most institutions is to gather knowledge through 
testimony, and then use it for political ends. He writes that “institutions…prompt people 
to speak… [and] store and distribute the things that are said” (Sexuality 11). The manic-
depressive and depressive are both expected to speak to their lived experience, to admit 
that they are sick, and in turn, the psychiatric establishment constructs for them a 
subjectivity that is, first and foremost, sick. One example of this is the location of mental 
illnesses within the body; while on one hand, this move legitimates madness as an 
embodied experience, it also allowed for the creation of a pathology of the mad. For 
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Foucault, psychiatry creates a discourse about mental illness that aims to reinforce a 
stable sense of what being is, and to silence existential questions that madness poses. If 
those who are mad are inherently sick, then it stands to reason that they should be 
contained as if they are a threat to the social fabric itself. Building upon Foucault’s 
concept of biopolitics, de Sutter declares that we are now in the age of psychopolitics.  In 
de Sutter’s view, psychopolitics takes up the explicit focus on “ordering the affects” of 
subjects (de Sutter 100). Like biopolitics, it supplants and obscures the existential 
questions posed by a politics that dominates through control; however, rather than 
seeking control through a regime of physical well-being, it seeks control through the 
ordering of affects, specifically, euphoria and anhedonia.  Psychopolitics obscures the 
fact that “being is the site of psychopolitics; there is no being outside the business of 
ordering the affects separating subjects from everything in them pertaining to the 
dysfunctional” (de Sutter 100). In this sense, the subjectivity that is generated under this 
regime is already in need of correction. To become a ‘healthy’ subject, one must submit 
to the notion that anything deemed dysfunctional is a symptom of an illness and allow 
oneself to be organized into a stable being.  
       When madness is posed as a problem of being, it is not because madness is inimical 
to being. Rather, it contests the popular conception that being is stable and constant, in 
the way that the self is unified and self-evident. For Foucault, whatever being may 
actually be is an entirely separate question from that which is projected onto the concept. 
He argues that madness was relegated into non-being and pushed out of language as a 
discursive subject. This move was a relegation, but this purposeful exclusion does not 
erase the fact that madness does generate possibilities, particularly as a form of 
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resistance. In terms employed by Deleuze and Guattari, madness belongs to becoming, 
rather than to being.  Understood this way, madness can be considered a force through 
which things become, and becoming, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, is an inherently 
productive act: “the act of becoming is a capturing, a possession, a plus-value, but never a 
reproduction or an imitation” (Kafka 13). Becoming both creates itself and a surplus—a 
by-product.   
       While Deleuze and Guattari present a reading of madness as resistance, there is 
another view, perhaps best represented by de Sutter, that “being…is the gift offered to all 
those who feel disjointed, to whom the possibility of a continuity solution is presented as 
the most desirable thing there is” (de Sutter 100). Being, offered in this way, is mere 
survival, bare life. It is the acceptance of anhedonia, the acceptance of mere existence, the 
acceptance of the narrow gap between all out suicidal depression and pedestrian despair. 
Consider that the “[indefinite neutralization of the libido] …is even accepted [as] the 
ultimate meaning of the phrase ‘getting better” (de Sutter 21). The phrase “getting better” 
isn’t so much about healing, as it is coming to terms with one’s abnormality. If one 
accepts that they are mad and that they need treatment, then even if that treatment causes 
its own dimension of suffering, it has already been accepted that if one is abnormal, then 
one can expect to live with a different set of expectations for life.   For de Sutter, society 
has now crossed the line; rather than desire as a force to be normalized, as in 
psychoanalysis, or desire as a productive force, it is now acceptable to expect the subject 
to exist without desire. Not only that, but the elimination of desire is a cure in and of 
itself. As de Sutter observes, this elimination of desire “[transforms subjects] into simple 
bodies, subject to examination and manipulation” (109). To eliminate desire is to 
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generate compliance by destroying both the impulse to revolt and the ability to see 
differently.  The current state of things becomes not just livable, but a bare life to 
celebrate and protect.  
       In locating madness in the body, desire becomes the source of the problem, and its 
excision is therapeutically necessary. This means that “getting better is not getting 
anywhere at all—it is existing only in the negative mode of being whose stability badly 
conceals the emptiness, as well as the suffering of not suffering, or of the feeling that you 
do not feel your suffering, in an inescapable downward spiral” (de Sutter 21). The subject 
is trained to recognize madness as an inherent defect, something to be managed and 
corrected, no matter the cost. As a process or affective mode, we have been trained to be 
okay with not asking for much, if anything, at all. The depressive and manic functions, 
which have been re-routed to turn towards themselves, don’t even think about themselves 
as questioning anything. They no longer offer a way out, but they do expose something 
about the game of psychiatric power. Psychiatric power is able to turn players against 
themselves, to take something and, through a discursive maneuver, simultaneously make 
the depressive believe they are crazy and that they are correct about the ultimate 
meaninglessness of life. It takes the manic function and convinces it that it needs to be 
anaesthetized for its own good. The depressive and manic functions are converted into 
states, and thus, the languages they speak and the meanings they produce must be 
confessed and disavowed, condemned to rambling and nonsense.  
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1.7. The Schizo 
       The schizophrenic, on the other hand, presents a madness of a different kind. One of 
the first categorical differences between the figures of affect and the schizophrenic is that 
the latter cannot be told that they are crazy.  Dubbed the “exterminating angel” of 
capitalism, the schizophrenic is the greatest challenge to repression, in the sense that they 
cannot accept that their madness is something that needs to be curbed (Deleuze and 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 35). The content of their delusions is beyond interpretation, and 
furthermore, these delusions cannot be reasoned with. It is impossible to sit a 
schizophrenic down and explain to them that their delusion, their product, is wrong. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the schizophrenic is “the absolute limit, but capitalism is 
the relative limit” (Anti-Oedipus 176). They argue that this is because the schizophrenic 
functions within language, as the hard limit of meaning, in the sense that it is the locus of 
its production. Capitalism appears limitless, but it cannot keep up with its own 
production. The schizo, on the other hand, is always producing; there is no break, no 
pause between productions. It works as a function within capitalism, is engendered by 
capitalism, but it is inimical to capitalism. The schizoid function creates new assemblages 
and new possibilities that are impossible to completely repress or sublimate into 
discourse.  
        Foucault argues that madness is prevented from participating in discourse as a 
speaker. The mad are turned into objects of knowledge and are disbarred from speaking 
for themselves. However, if we understand madness as a function within language, then it 
can be seen as both productive of and indispensable to language—that is, being. This 
function is the absolute limit because once it is reached, it decodes “the flows of desire” 
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(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 177). Capitalism is flexible, appearing to be 
infinitely so. However, it still relies upon a harnessing control of desire. This means that 
it still needs a precise configuration upon which to function. Psychoanalysis, rather than 
questioning the fundamental role of capitalism in the psychic instability of the subject, 
chooses to forge a subjectivity that internalizes that instability, managing it through 
repression.  However, the schizoid function works against this, as “the schizophrenic 
deliberately seeks out the very limit of capitalism: he is its inherent tendency brought to 
fulfillment, its surplus product” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 35). Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that the schizo-analysis is the destructive process through which the 
repression of psychoanalysis can be undone. They write, “schizo-analysis forgoes all 
interpretation because it forgoes discovering an unconscious material: the unconscious 
does not mean anything” (Anti-Oedipus 180). It may seem counter-intuitive to refer to a 
process as analytic if it does not interpret a concept. However, the function of analysis 
under schizophrenia is not to find meaning. Rather, the analytic process is to find the 
gaps and interruptions that structure meaning. These gaps are useful for resistance as they 
are a weak spot in the chain of meaning. The stated goal of schizo-analysis is: “to analyze 
the specific nature of the libidinal investments in the economic and political spheres, and 
thereby to show how, in the subject who desires, desire can be made to desire its own 
repression” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 105). Therefore, schizo-analysis is a 
hermeneutic developed, not to legitimate repression the way psychoanalysis does, but 
rather, to blow it up. Schizo-analysis, in seeking the faults in psychoanalytic logic, will 
demonstrate that repression, while it does not originate within the subject, has taken root 
within the subject as something that is desired, or, in other words, “breaks or 
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interruptions are not the result of an analysis; rather, in and of themselves, they are 
syntheses” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 41). Analysis does not create gaps, in the 
sense that whenever there is meaning there is a gap. Schizo-analysis treats the gaps as 
concepts within themselves. They are little bits of dynamite, which, if triggered correctly, 
can free themselves.  
        That is why, for Deleuze and Guattari, schizo-analysis is also the method by which 
capitalism can be resisted. Schizo-analysis breaks and rearranges the axioms that 
psychoanalysis entrenches. Capitalism is difficult to resist because it is infinitely flexible: 
“the strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, 
that it is always capable of adding a new axiom to the previous ones” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 250). Capitalism is productive, and not only does it make 
meaning, it can make any meaning that one wants it to have. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
“capitalism defines a field of immanence and never ceases to fully occupy the field” 
(Anti-Oedipus 250). They essentially argue that capitalism embodies and weaponizes all 
the apparent contradictions within the social field, for it is generated by conflict. Schizo-
analysis works on this same level of immanence, and it, too, works in contradictions. It 
has no deeper motive, no hidden agenda beyond destruction— for “schizophrenia is not 
the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 246).  Here, they explicitly challenge the notion that 
capitalism, itself, is schizoid; while it may have schizoid features, capitalism is not 
schizophrenic.  Moreover, they suggest, the death of capitalism will not come from 
rejecting it, but rather, creating the conditions under which it explodes.  
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      One of the ways to create these conditions is to look at the way that capitalism has 
formed the subject. As a prefix, schizo means split. While Deleuze and Guattari do not 
advocate for a unified subject, they argue that psychoanalysis actually creates schisms 
between the conscious and unconscious that do not exist. They liken the unconscious to a 
machine that produces assemblages, rather than spitting out a rotation of transhistorical 
symbols. Psychoanalysis aims to achieve integration, whereas schizo-analysis aims to 
create division. Psychoanalysis holds the unconscious to be a unitary entity that, despite 
being unknowable, is able to nonetheless think and speak in symbols that are not only 
comprehensible, but also map perfectly onto known representations. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, the unconscious does not produce reproductions and representations of the 
external world. Rather, the unconscious produces new assemblages, new meanings, and 
new linguistic possibilities. They write that “the unconscious does not speak, it 
engineers. It is not expressive or representative, but productive” (Anti-Oedipus 180). 
This means that it does not think, and furthermore, what the unconscious thinks is beside 
the point. What is important is its products.     
       Psychoanalysis takes the chaos, the excess generated by capitalism, and calls it 
neurosis—Oedipus, even though the schizophrenic cannot tolerate the being called 
Oedipus. In fact, while the process of schizophrenization is independent of Oedipus and 
Hamlet, it is nonetheless aggravated by psychoanalysis. Deleuze and Guattari write:  
Will it be retorted that the schizo is not joyous either? But doesn’t his sadness come 
from the fact that he can no longer bear the forces of oedipalization and 
[H]amletization that hem him in on all sides? Better to flee to the body without organs 
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and hide out there, closing himself up in it. The little joy lies in the schizophrenization 
as a process, not in the schizo as a clinical entity. (Anti-Oedipus 113) 
Once again, they differentiate between the figure of the schizophrenic and its clinical 
counterpart. However, Deleuze and Guattari use the figure of the schizophrenic, who 
resists psychoanalysis, as a way of generating the enemy, the destructive weapon that can 
be deployed against psychoanalysis. Schizo-analysis is a destructive process through 
which the repression of psychoanalysis can be undone. It takes, as its first principle, that 
the unconscious cannot be interpreted because it does not generate anything for the 
purpose of being understood. Psychoanalysis tries to make everything legible, and in the 
process, always only finds itself. As I will discuss later, their interest in Franz Kafka—
and the way that he literalizes and deforms metaphor—comes from this interest in using 





Chapter 2  
2. Against Despair: Figures of Transformation in Kafka and 
Wallace  
      In an essay entitled “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Precursor of Kafka, Céline, and Ponge,” 
Gilles Deleuze argues that cruelty does not exist until humans enter a social state. He 
writes, “humanity, as supposed in a state of nature, cannot be mean, since the objective 
conditions that make human meanness and its exercise possible do not exist in nature 
itself” (Desert 52). In Deleuze’s terms, meanness is unimaginable outside of civil society 
because civil society creates the conditions under which self-interest becomes necessary 
for survival. While this applies to any civil state, Deleuze argues that this becomes most 
evident with the emergence of capitalism. He credits Engels with taking Rousseau’s point 
to its logical end: “violence or oppression does not constitute a primordial fact, but 
supposes a civil state, social situations, and economic determinations” (Desert 53). In 
other words, the conflict and social inequality arising from the pursuit of self-interest are 
inescapable consequences of a society structured precisely around the competition of 
interests.  In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari often turn to literature as a way of 
speculating about possible paths towards justice and as a means of addressing the 
conflicts of civil society, broadly understood.  In his Deleuzian reading of the works of 
Thomas Pynchon, Stefan Mattessich explains the appropriateness of this move when he 
observes, “with the coalescence of consumption as a primary interpolative fact of social 
life, enmeshing the subject within the spectral structures of global markets and the 
ideological ‘freedom’ of commerce, new narrative forms and conceptual tools are needed 
to grasp the ‘event’ that this development presupposes” (Mattessich 14-15). As 
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Mattessich suggests and as Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate, literature can present new 
ways of representing this conflict in language. This project, I would argue, is central to 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest. 
Much of the scholarship on Wallace’s fiction looks to his work for answers on an 
individual level. John Baskin argues that Infinite Jest is an attempt to integrate 
philosophy and literature in order to offer the reader a therapy, that Baskin terms 
“revaluation,” in which the reader comes to reconsider their immediate judgements of 
Hal, a tennis prodigy and near genius, and Don Gately, a convict living in a half-way 
house (Baskin 46).  In a similar vein, Adam Kelly argues that Wallace is championing a 
“new sincerity,” designed to set the reader on the path towards honesty, reflection and 
integrity, “an answer to problems raised by the legacy of a modernist insistence on an 
aesthetic view of the world, and on the priority of authentic expression, or an artistic 
autonomy, over sincere communication” (Kelly, “The New Sincerity” 200). However, in 
their insistence upon the healing power of Wallace’s fiction, both these arguments fail to 
consider sufficiently the dystopic setting of Infinite Jest. Hal Incandenza and Don Gately 
are not presented together so that the reader can see that their classist and elitist 
judgements are wrong; rather, these two characters from apparently different 
backgrounds live in a civil state that not just engenders but thrives upon class conflict and 
inequality.  In the bizarre and horrifying world of the novel, time is subsidized; America, 
Canada and Mexico now form the Organization of North American Nations, celebrating 
Interdependence Day on November 8; and a band of disabled French Canadians named 
Les Assasins des Fauteuils Rollents are fighting for independence from America by 
broadcasting a tape so entertaining that it renders its viewers vegetative (Wallace, Infinite 
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Jest 259, 325, 89).  Significantly, the most despairing moments in Infinite Jest transpire 
not when people ruminate on the past, but rather, when they contemplate the present 
moment.  In the world Wallace represents, addiction and depression are the only sensible 
responses.  
To quote Kate Gompert, living with depression is “like horror more than sadness” 
(Wallace, Infinite Jest 73). Describing the experience of living with clinical depression, 
she tells her doctor: “everything gets horrible. Everything you see gets ugly. Lurid is the 
word” (73). The traumatic experience of living with depression has led to her dependence 
on cannabis, which in some ways, exacerbates the problem (75). Gompert is one of the 
few characters in the novel whose addiction is tied so completely to circumstances 
outside of her control. Her depression is treatment resistant, and none of her doctors can 
comprehend the depth of the pain with which she lives (69). From the outside, her 
compulsions, from the cannabis dependence to multiple suicide attempts, make no sense. 
But from Gompert’s perspective, it is quite different. She likens living with depression to 
being trapped in a burning building, though no one can see the fire; jumping from the top 
window looks completely insane to those outside, but only because no one else can see 
the flames (696).  As the novel suggests, her maladaptive and suicidal behaviour is an 
attempt to regulate the pain of her mere existence, as is her repetitive consumption of 
cannabis. The compulsion itself is not the problem; rather, it is a necessary function so 
that an organism—the subject under consumer capitalism—can keep functioning. In 
Wallace’s novel, the subject cannot somehow ‘escape’ from or triumph over a confluence 
of multiple forces that generate the totalizing system. The constant references to ever 
present entertainment, from professional sports to movies to advertisements, confirm this 
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at every turn. Wallace writes, “what metro Boston AAs are trite but correct about is that 
both destiny’s kisses and its dope-slaps illustrate an individual person’s basic personal 
powerlessness over the really meaningful events of his life” (291).   If the system did not 
generate addicts, then, presumably, one could assume that people are content simply to sit 
down and to passively take in all the entertainment around them.  In Wallace’s novel, the 
only sensible reaction to so much stimulation is to try and regulate the nervous system in 
some other way, and the way in which the subject chooses to self-regulate is the only 
form of agency that remains.   
        Though there is no outside to the total system of consumer capitalism in Infinite 
Jest, addiction does present opportunities to poke around for a trap door. In order to 
understand how the addict functions as an anti-systemic figure, it is useful to look at the 
way that Deleuze and Guattari describe the schizophrenic, and how the schizophrenic 
operates within language.  I also want to consider their use of Kafka to talk about the 
politics of twentieth century Europe, in order to argue that the addict in Wallace, much 
like the schizo in Deleuze and Guattari, is the figure who will come to define both the 
state border and the barbarian that skulks around the gate.   
2.1. The Schizophrenic in Language 
        For Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism and language are two systems that inform each 
other. All systems, whether they be economic or linguistic, construct and order the 
subject.  But as Deleuze and Guattari argue in Anti-Oedipus, schizophrenia is, primarily, 
a function within language, produced by the pressures of capitalism.  The schizophrenic 
function within language is only possible because of the schizoid features of capitalism; 
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the delirium it induces, the endless flow of concepts it produces and the superfluity of 
meaning it generates. The schizoid function in language is also potentially explosive, in 
the sense that it produces beyond the capacity of language, creating new assemblages at a 
relentless place.  
       But Deleuze and Guattari also see language as a possible point of resistance, and 
literature as the machine best suited for the job. Representation and repression are 
affected by language and the law of the signifier, and literature, in their view, is precisely 
the place where language can fragment and break into lines of flight.  If representation 
and repression are found at the level of the signifier, then breaking language is the most 
effective way to resist oppression.  As Deleuze and Guattari explain, the function of 
language is not limited to conveying meaning, a function that becomes visible at “the 
moment when language is no longer defined by what it says, even less by what makes it a 
signifying thing, but by what causes it to move, to flow, and to explode—desire. For 
literature is like schizophrenia: a process and not a goal, a production and not an 
expression” (Anti-Oedipus 133). Literature creates new assemblages; its principal 
function is to produce itself, not to express a particular higher meaning. It is immanent, 
not transcendent.  
        However, this does not mean that literature is trying to reach a non-linguistic realm 
that precedes language. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, “if language always seems to 
presuppose itself… we cannot assign it a non-linguistic point of departure, it is because 
language does not operate between something seen (or felt) and something said, but 
always goes from saying to saying” (Plateaus 76). There is no way out of language, just 
as there is no way to get outside a total system.  The operation of language is to generate 
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assemblages, and for Deleuze and Guattari, language can be best understood as a series of 
sayings and expressions that are combined into assemblages. What is interesting is not 
the meaning of expressions but the way that they are fitted together. The effects of 
language are indirect, by-products of its chief function, which is its own perpetuation, for 
“metaphors and metonymies are merely effects; they are a part of language only when 
they presuppose indirect discourse” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 77). Metaphors and 
metonymies are “indirect” in the sense that they do not directly represent the thing which 
they are meant to signify. But for Deleuze and Guattari, metaphor and metonymy are 
simply rhetorical tools deployed within language, and they are to be distinguished from 
the revolutionary potential of literature, which resides elsewhere. For too long, Deleuze 
and Guattari argue, the reading of texts has focused on effects, on an intentional aesthetic 
gesture rather than the revolutionary potential coming from the way that the reader 
assembles the text. They write that “reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search 
of what is signified, still less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier. Rather it is 
a productive use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring-machines, a schizoid 
exercise that extracts from the text its revolutionary force” (Anti-Oedipus 106). In other 
words, readers—both recreational and scholarly—consistently misrecognize the 
revolutionary potential in a book. It is thought to be within the book itself, encoded 
within the intentions of the author, but it is actually activated by the productive reader. 2 
 
2 In an essay entitled “Desert Islands”, Deleuze argues that the narratives that develop using the desert 
island as a setting, are stories about trying to appropriate and understand myths that are no longer 
understood. Deleuze writes, “literature is an attempt to interpret, in an ingenious way, the myths we no 
longer understand, at the moment we no longer understand them” (Desert, 12). The revolutionary potential 
in literature lies in its ability to reimagine the liminal, mythic space from which language springs. That 
right at the moment at which it appears to be impossible, remembering becomes possible not through 
reinterpretation but recreation. 
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2.2. Misinterpretation: Literature and Psychoanalysis 
        For Deleuze and Guattari, literature makes change possible, not through an 
intentionality inscribed in the text, but through the way that the texts are productively 
activated by the reader.  One of the reasons that Deleuze and Guattari argue so heavily 
against psychoanalysis is that it has also been taken up as a method of reading and talking 
about literature.  Psychoanalysis, in their view, seeks only to prove itself and to normalize 
the objects of its discourse. Furthermore, psychoanalysis works to cage revolutionary 
potential. It focuses on metaphor and metonymy, celebrating the intentionality of the 
author’s unconscious which, coincidentally, always refers to the theatre of the family and, 
in the view of Deleuze and Guattari, to ludicrous misinterpretations of the unconscious.  
Everything can become a symptom or a sign, a clue to a supposed larger meaning or 
intention. However, psychoanalysis is only capable of finding itself. In this vein, it makes 
perfect sense that psychoanalysis would gravitate towards mythology and theatre. 
Through Hamlet and Oedipus, we see how the figures of myth and theatre work together 
to create a world. For Deleuze and Guattari, oedipalization and Hamletization are two of 
the most conspicuous ways in which psychoanalysis pursues its ends. Oedipalization and 
Hamletization create a series of symbols and meanings through which literature is tasked 
with proving itself and through which the subject is contained.  Psychoanalysis, Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest, typically asks “were you born Hamlet? Or did you not rather create 
the type in yourself?” (Anti-Oedipus 298). The subject is asked to identify with and 
project themself onto these figures, so that they come to understand themself as a 
symbolic representation—i.e. a type or copy of what had come before. Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “myth and tragedy are systems of symbolic representations that still refer 
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desire to determinate exterior conditions as well as to particular objective codes—the 
body of the Earth, the despotic body—and that in this way confound the discovery of the 
abstract or subjective essence” (Anti-Oedipus 300). In mythic figures, the subject comes 
to recognize themself as a part of a system of representation that precedes their existence. 
The dependence of psychoanalysis upon symbolism and its insistence on interpreting 
through the lens of the theatre of the family means that it can only lead to limited claims 
about literature. Vladimir Nabokov, who absolutely loathed Freudians and their 
interpretations of art, said, “let the credulous and the vulgar continue to believe that all 
mental woes can be cured by a daily application of old Greek myths to their private parts. 
I really do not care” (Strong Opinions 66). In literature, psychoanalysis aims to find 
Oedipus or Hamlet; it cannot speak otherwise, and the processes of oedipalization and 
Hamletization that it discovers in the text typically rely on the notion of character, using 
it as a metaphor for the subject.  
2.3. Kafka, Vermin and Territories 
         However, not all literature relies on metaphor, and for this reason, Deleuze and 
Guattari gravitate toward the work of Franz Kafka. In his enigmatic tales of bureaucracy 
and despair, Kafka hits on something that had previously been unseen, a potential exit. 
Stanley Corngold writes,  
In the universe of semioticians in which all entities are signs, all groups texts, and 
all experience interpretations—in which no self exists, except as the series 
without paradigm of its readings, and the vale of soul making has been developed 
into the archive of soul-marking—Kafka’s work would seem to occupy a 
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privileged position because of the rigour with which it holds this view to be 
deranged. (“Principles of Kafka Interpretation” 294) 
Kafka’s work rejects the logic of the sign, the idea that everything can be interpreted as a 
stand in for anything else. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, Kafka says “kill metaphor” 
(Kafka 70). As Corngold explains, Kafka’s critique of “metaphorical reason” through his 
“fictions provoke ongoing metamorphosis, which exposes, dismantles, and hence 
destroys metaphor” (“Metaphor and Chiasm” 97). The destruction of metaphor is not just 
a rhetorical ploy, but also the way to show the instability of the meaning which metaphor 
conveys (“Metaphor and Chiasm” 104). Because metaphor insists on substituting one 
thing for another, or, more precisely, one image for another, it depends upon a likeness or 
a similitude that always ultimately proves unstable.  
        In psychoanalysis, myths are used as metaphors to create a connection between a 
symptom and the subject. But in the logic of Kafka’s literature, there is no room for 
Oedipus to thrive. There is an immediacy to Kafka’s literature that presents the 
“consistent…ontological insight into the dereliction, the untruthful character, of ordinary 
consciousness, whose prejudices in its own favor require abrupt reversal” (Corngold, 
“Metaphor and Chiasm” 104).  Rather than point to some hidden depth, Kafka elects 
merely to use images for their literal immediacy, rather than as a sign of another image or 
signified. This literalization of metaphor is also the mode of representation necessary to 
non-reason; for non-reason to resist capture in metaphor, it must pivot to immediacy. 
Gregor’s transformation is not a metaphor for his being; rather, he was always regarded 
as vermin. His transformation is horrifying, but no one ever suggests that another animal 
would have been more fitting. This implies that the other characters all agree, to some 
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extent, that becoming a beetle was appropriate for Gregor. Transformation is one way to 
generate a means of representation that could gesture beyond current material conditions, 
towards different possibilities. While it is important to remember that “we cannot go 
outside the world of things we can express in order to express something,” it should not 
be forgotten that expressions can be transformed (Schuman 24). Indeed, the power in 
literature lies in its productivity—its insistence upon creating different expressions from 
the ones that came before  
       A book cannot be rewritten, but it can be reread. In his reading of The 
Metamorphosis, which he refers to as The Transformation, Nabokov insists that Kafka, 
and by extension, Gregor, did not know that he had become a dung beetle; had he known, 
Gregor could have flown away the entire time (Nabokov, Strong Opinions 90).  One 
might suggest that this is but one instance of Kafka stumbling upon an exit, a trap door, 
even if it was not recognized. However, this moment in Nabokov’s discussion is more 
interesting when considered in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
territorialisation.  For Deleuze and Guattari, anything can, in and of itself, be considered a 
territory. Concepts, words and language are territories that can be and are occupied. 
Concepts are generated, but they are born from previously existing territories. Even if 
they break out, seemingly free from all previous meaning, there is always a way in which 
they are connected to an overall chain. Territories are always moving through this process 
of being both claimed and not. More often than not, the same concept, language, or 
territory is both, simultaneously: “an island doesn’t stop being deserted simply because it 
is inhabited” (Deleuze Desert 10). This means that there is always another way, a place 
within dominance where it can be contested and resisted. The transformation of Gregor, 
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from human to dung beetle, is genius not just for the simple fact that he was always a 
creature beneath contempt; it is genius because the subject under consumer capitalism is 
always already occupying this liminal space— the subject is both and neither, a human, a 
louse.  
       In Kafka’s literalization of metaphor, Deleuze and Guattari argue that he 
deterritorializes metaphor through literal transformation. However, “as long as there is 
form, there is still reterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari Kafka 6). Wherever there is 
a territory, a metaphor, there is always a place that can be evacuated and occupied, 
annexed or reclaimed. Corngold, for his part, argues that Kafka amplifies this tension to 
an almost comic level: “in organizing stories around the effort to interpret image-words 
and concept-words advantageously, in making culpability and even death the cost of 
failure in this effort, Kafka dramatizes the severity of this struggle” (“Metaphor and 
Chiasm” 95). The futility of trying to establish and articulate an assigned fixed meaning 
to words also mirrors the kind of political subjectivity theorized and advanced by 
Foucault, as well as Deleuze and Guattari.  In their view, the supposedly unified subject 
is an assemblage of different territories, generated through the different ways in which 
assemblages are fitted together. 
       In Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari present this 
understanding of subjectivity in terms of a linguistic function. Using Kafka’s literature as 
an example, they argue that there are two broad categories of national literatures that 
have two distinct functions. The first is “major” literature: it functions to serve the 
dominant language and political power structures of a nation. Deleuze and Guattari write, 
“in major literatures…the individual concern (familial, marital, and so on) joins with 
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other no less individual concerns, the social milieu serving as a mere environment or 
background” (Kafka 17). While major literature has a political function, it is not to point 
to a collective. Rather, it presents to the subject the way that it presents the nation: as a 
piece of the story, a cog that keeps the narrative rolling towards a terminus. Minor 
literature differs in a very distinct way: it cannot help but to be political. It is “completely 
different; its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to 
politics. The individual concern thus becomes all the more necessary, indispensable, 
magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it” (Deleuze and Guattari 
Kafka 17). Instead of the individual concern remaining contained to itself, minor 
literature forces the individual to become collective; in other words, the subject cannot 
help but explicitly manifest at a flashpoint between political forces which operate on the 
collective. 
       Deleuze and Guattari explain this linguistically through the example of the 
dominance of German for Kafka. They argue that Kafka, a Jew from Prague, knew 
German, Czech, French and Italian; he learned Hebrew later in life, and was at least 
familiar with Yiddish (Kafka 25). Through his grasp of Yiddish and Czech, Kafka was 
able to “make German take flight on a line of escape.” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 26). 
Deleuze and Guattari continue, “he will turn syntax into a cry that will embrace the rigid 
syntax of this dried-up German. He will push it toward a deterritorialization that will no 
longer be saved by culture or by myth” (Kafka 26). The revolutionary potential of minor 
literature, its political possibility, resides in its ability to push the dominant language to 
the limits of what it can represent, so that it assembles something totally new. It is made 
foreign to itself in the way that the dominant language forces the non-native speaker to 
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speak in a language which alienates them. While Kafka would have grown up speaking 
German, he knew other languages; he knew what German lacked, how it could be forced 
into its own limits.  For Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka is also representative of a much 
wider impulse; they argue that potential for a minor literature necessarily exists where a 
dominant or ‘major’ language exists. They argue, “how many people today live in a 
language that is not their own? Or no longer, or not yet, even know their own and know 
poorly the language that they are forced to serve?” (Kafka 19). In this sense, the potential 
for a minor language to push back, to grow and explode its own language beyond 
representation, is ever present and, in fact, is engendered by the very forces that 
colonized and attempted to snuff it out. Colonization, and the violent state apparatus that 
enables it, becomes dominant by the very means that could also assure its own 
destruction. This means that resistance is possible, and wherever resistance can be found, 
there is a possibility for things to be different.    
       But how does the elimination of metaphor in The Metamorphosis engender any kind 
of revolution? At first, it appears impossible that the lowly, inconsequential life of Gregor 
Samsa could, in any way, offer resistance. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, Samsa 
always had a way out; he just didn’t know it. However, it is important to remember the 
function of the transformation: “with this metamorphosis Kafka reverses the original act 
of metamorphosis carried out by thought when it forms metaphor; for metaphor is always 
‘metamorphosis.’ Kafka transforms metaphor back into his fictional reality, and this 
counter-metamorphosis becomes the starting point of his tale” (Skokel qtd. in Corngold, 
“Metaphor and Chiasm” 90). Rather than Gregor being like a beetle, he becomes a beetle. 
He is not like a pest; he becomes the vermin that he was always perceived to be. 
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Therefore, although he is inarguably an insect, the word vermin is used in the English 
translation. According to Schuman, “our notion of Gregor as ‘a vermin,’ a human with 
some applicable vermin-like qualities, undergoes a necessary transformation into the 
realization that he actually is a vermin” (Schuman 28). It is important to stress that 
Gregor is not a parasite, or a pest. Rather, he simply becomes what he is regarded to be 
by his family, the director, the bureaucrats who come to hunt him down. The nature of 
Gregor’s transformation is that he becomes what he always was: a creature regarded as 
lowly and subhuman, for whom the question of agency and expression is laughable. 
       To borrow the language of Deleuze and Guattari, Gregor’s transformation is one of 
becoming-animal; his human subjectivity is turned inside-out or evolves into what it was 
before domestication.  For Deleuze and Guattari, “Gregor becomes a cockroach not to 
flee his father but rather to find an escape where his father didn’t know to find one, in 
order to flee the director, the business, and the bureaucrats, to reach that region where the 
voice no longer does anything but hum” (Kafka 13). The accompanying hum, the clicks 
of a beetle, are essential features of the story. Not only does Gregor become 
incomprehensible to those around him, but his “language stops being representative in 
order to now move toward its extremities or its limits” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 23). 
His own speech is no longer his own. He is made to speak in a tongue that he does not 
know but nonetheless he can grasp and deploy; however, it is incomprehensible to those 
around him. He truly becomes vermin, not when he is unable to speak but when his 
speech no longer means anything to other people.  
     There are many ways to think about major and minor literatures. They are functions 
specific to literature, and while they are a discursive practice, they are not innate to 
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language.  However, these functions have social dimensions. While Deleuze and Guattari 
might be read as opposing all representative interpretation, their opposition is more 
specifically directed against interpretations of literature which result in the emergence 
and consecration of figures who would serve to uphold a repression that they associate 
most often, in Anti-Oedipus, with psychoanalysis. However, this does not mean that these 
consecrated figures do not continue to influence reading and interpretation, nor does it 
mean that we can simply break away from them.  
2.4. Representations of Madness 
        One could go so far as to say that it is impossible to break fully from figures of 
repression in literature. This is why, in the case of figures of madness, Deleuze and 
Guattari aim to reterritorialize them. The schizophrenic, the depressive and the manic-
depressive are all both actual, non-mythic entities and figures that emerge from the 
lineage of the eighteenth-century madman. What is of interest here are not the clinical 
manifestations of schizophrenia, depression and manic-depression, but the ways in which 
a new figure emerges from their lineage, a figure who resists the oedipalization not by 
refusing it, but by completely submitting to the hypothesis that trauma changes the body. 
A figure who says, ‘okay, okay, call me what you want, explain me to me in whichever 
way works, but I won’t fundamentally change, no, I can’t even if I tried.’  This is the 
position occupied by the figure of the addict in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest.  It is 
not by mere accident that Wallace was interested in Kafka, but in order to understand the 
affinities between his work and that of Kafka, it is important to consider first the notion 
of repression under capitalism and the turn towards schizo-analysis.   
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      In an interview published in response to Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze declares: 
“psychoanalysis has this pious conception of itself; through lack and castration, it makes 
itself out to be a kind of negative theology which entails calling on infinite 
resignation...this is what we oppose. And in its place we suppose a positive conception of 
desire: a desire that produces” (Desert 223). Positing desire as a productive machine 
which manufactures assemblages and concepts was aimed at turning psychoanalysis on 
its head.  The question was no longer what the unconscious is trying to say, but what 
psychoanalysis is trying to repress. Guattari warned that “we ought to ask ourselves 
whether the expression of politicians, scientists, and the military is not in fact precisely a 
kind of anti-production, a kind of repression working at the level of expression, whose 
goal is to stop the work of questioning” (“Capitalism and Schizophrenia” 239). It is 
crucial to understand that Guattari is saying the repression is anti-productive, in the sense 
that what it produces is obfuscation. For Deleuze and Guattari, psychoanalysis as a theory 
and as a therapeutic practice is weaponized by capitalism, as “from its birth, capitalism 
has been connected with a savage repression” (Desert 268). This means that capitalism 
runs upon a principle of repression that functions in specific ways. Under consumer 
capitalism, one mistakes the freedom to choose between different products and the 
oversaturation of markets for liberation.  In a related way, psychoanalysis works by 
telling the subject that they are not caught in a trap at all; rather, they, themselves are the 
source of their own ensnarement. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is a forgone conclusion: 
“Oedipus and castration work like a charm. But we want to know what are their effects: 
they work but at what price?” (Desert 229).  The question that Deleuze and Guattari are 
interested in answering is what does oedipalization actually do to us? To that question, 
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Mattessich offers a compelling answer: “desire in our time is not a predicative state of 
being, linked to a signified in which it finds satisfaction. Encased in discourse, trivialized 
by consumerism, terrorized in everyday life, it recovers itself in the abyssal apprehension 
of its own disappearance” (Mattessich 11). Oedipalization functions, first and foremost, 
to contain and direct desire so that the subject is trained to desire their own oppression. 
The ensnarement of desire, the creeping sense of uneasiness, the need to crawl out of 
one’s own skin are all symptoms of this oppression, which point toward a clinically 
understood notion of madness.  In the creation of schizo-analysis, Deleuze and Guattari 
aim to undo the damage of psychoanalysis, and to get to the heart of a different notion of 
madness. Deleuze says: 
 The transformation of psychoanalysis into schizo-analysis implies an evaluation 
of the specificity of madness. This is just one of the points Guattari insists on, 
joining forces with Foucault, who says that madness will not be replaced by the 
positivist determination, treatment and neutralization of mental illness, but that 
mental illness will be replaced by something we have not yet understood as 
madness. (Desert 200)  
Part of their argument is that mental illness is poorly understood by those who are 
treating it. Rather than adequately treating madness by addressing the root of its cause, 
the repression engendered by capitalism, psychiatric medicine sets itself up as another 
system of domination and control. As Guattari observes, “psychiatric hospitals are 
essentially structured like a state bureaucracy, and psychiatrists are bureaucrats” 
(“Capitalism and Schizophrenia” 271). However, what is most important is that 
conventional treatment does not neutralize mental illness; rather, this approach only 
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exacerbates it, for treatment reproduces the material conditions that create depression, 
manic-depression and schizophrenia. For Deleuze, an adequate understanding of madness 
involves more than regarding it as something that can be cured, as if it were somehow 
independent of its surroundings. It is in this same spirit that Deleuze declares, “whoever 
does not laugh out loud while reading Kafka does not truly admire Kafka” (Desert 52). 
For Deleuze, Kafka is an author who transforms the monstrous reality of contemporary 
life into stories that joyfully affirm the horror of everyday living. There is a distinct 
fetishization of trauma, madness and the tragic that many people mistake for good art. 
However, Kafka’s work, like that of Wallace, is first and foremost, funny. Deleuze 
bemoans the tendency to put angst and tragedy on a platform: “this pseudo-sense of the 
tragic makes us stupid. How many authors we deface by substituting a puerile, tragic 
feeling for the aggressive, comic power of thought which animates their work” (Chapsal 
qtd. in Deleuze, Desert 134). Tragedy is privileged over comedy, in the sense that it is 
perceived as more real, intelligent. However, that is not the case. By privileging the 
tragic, in a sense, we celebrate the everyday monstrosities, both large and small. Not only 
are they normalized, but tragedy gives tolerating the everyday a sense of valor. However, 
in Kafka’s writing, valor is not possible. All the typical stances of the tragic hero are 
unavailable to his protagonists. They merely exist in circumstances so pedestrian and 
ludicrous that it is impossible to do anything but laugh at their vain attempts to navigate 
the world, as if they are not what they already are. 
2.5. Consider Wallace and Kafka 
To understand the addict, we must look at David Foster Wallace’s relationship to 
Kafka. He was an admirer of Kafka’s work, particularly, of the way that he was able to 
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weaponize expressions to evoke both horror and delight at the monstrous dimensions of 
psychic life under the regimes of capitalism and the bureaucratic state, systems that exist 
merely to propagate themselves through human hosts. Wallace once said that “Kafka’s 
evocations are, rather, unconscious and almost sort of sub-archetypal, the primordial 
little-kid stuff from which myths derive” (Wallace, “Some Remarks” 62). The key here, 
however, is that Kafka does not use mythic force the same way that psychoanalysis does. 
Rather, the expressions invoked by Kafka are the cries of someone who does not fetishize 
their own repression. Even though Gregor tries to normalize the parasitic relationship 
between himself and his family, his body betrays him and chooses itself.  
        When David Foster Wallace published his second novel, Infinite Jest, it was 
received as the last hurrah of American postmodernism. However, the first chapter is, in 
many ways, an appropriation of The Metamorphosis rather than an ode to American 
postmodernism. It begins with a scene that features a central character, Hal, a gifted 
student and tennis prodigy, trying to communicate to a panel of administrators who are 
evaluating him for admission to university. Like Gregor, Hal experiences a physical 
impediment in his ability to speak to others. While Hal does not transform, he does 
become what he is in the same way Gregor does. He becomes locked in, incapable of 
speaking to those around him. When he is prompted to speak, only the reader knows that 
Hal is inside; all the administrators hear are subhuman noises. Like Gregor, Hal is 
capable only of making clicking noises, “only marginally mammalian” (Wallace, Infinite 
Jest 15). Hal’s speech becomes a series of clicks, a Morse code, in an effort “to reach a 
region where the voice no longer does anything but hum: ‘Did you hear him? It was an 
animal’s voice’” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 13). Like Gregor, whose transformation 
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allows him to flee from his family, Hal’s transformation resists the university bureaucrats 
who stand to profit from his recruitment.  
      Of Gregor’s impotent attempts at speech, Deleuze and Guattari write, “in the 
becoming insect, it is a mournful whining that carries along the voice and blurs the 
resonance of words” (Kafka 13). Hal’s words are received by his audience as 
“subanimalistic noises and sounds,” and, “like some sort of animal with something in its 
mouth” (Wallace, Infinite Jest 14). Hal tries to convey something, despite knowing its 
futility. While this can be read as an allusion to Kafka figured as an author of a minor 
literature, a character with their voice obstructed, it is also a non-figurative way of 
showing what it means to occupy the margins of language, where what one utters is not 
what others can hear. This fixation on speech versus sound is crucial, for while the reader 
can read what Hal is thinking, they cannot hear the noises he makes. The inverse is true 
of the administrators. He is aware of this, saying both, “I am not what you see and hear” 
and “I’d tell you all you want and more, if the sounds I made could be what you heard” 
(13; 9). Hal, painfully self-conscious, is concerned with the way he is misperceived: “I 
cannot make myself understood, now. I am speaking slowly, distinctly” (10). The tension 
between Hal’s disclosive voice, directed at the reader, and whatever noises he is making 
at the administrators, separates the official discourse of the administrative, civil and 
therapeutic apparatuses from the notion of sense, from the potential for an oppositional 
discourse that escapes or sits outside the regime of oppression.  
      However, rather than insisting upon his sanity, Hal implies that he does not have a 
reliable grip upon reality. When he is about to be left alone in the room with the 
administrators, he thinks, “I would yield to the urge to bolt for the door ahead of them if I 
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could know that bolting for the door is what the men in this room would see” (Wallace, 
Infinite Jest 8). In conjunction with his statement, “I believe I appear neutral, maybe even 
pleasant, but I have been coached to err on the side of neutrality and not attempt what 
would feel to me like a pleasant expression or smile,” it is safe to assume that whatever is 
happening to him is both beyond his control and complete comprehension (3). This is 
because if he could understand what was happening, he would, presumably, be able to 
control what was happening, or at least, know what he looked like to other people. While 
Gregor hides himself away out of sensitivity towards his mother and sister, Hal does not 
have that option. As he is held down to the floor, all he can say is: “there is nothing 
wrong,’ I say slowly to the floor. ‘I’m in here” (13). In this gesture of reassurance, there 
is a plea to be understood, as if accepting one’s own precarious grip on reality could be 
the way towards connection. Unfortunately for Hal, like Gregor, he is simply seen as he 
is, with no regard for the being inside.  
       Many read Hal as a version of Hamlet; both are hyperaware of how they are 
perceived by others; their fathers reappear as ghosts and their mothers have dubious 
relations with their uncles. Hal finds his father dead via microwave, and he is forced, 
subsequently, by his mother to attend trauma therapy (Wallace, Infinite Jest 253).  
Realizing that he would not be able to get out of therapy without an overdramatic 
confession, Hal puts his head in his hands and confesses his shame to have initially found 
the scent of his father’s cooked head to be “delicious” (256). This is clearly intended as a 
joke, but the therapist takes it seriously, and regards Hal’s confession as a breakthrough. 
Hal is then allowed to return to his athletic and academic endeavours.  As an example of 
how one is meant to submit in the therapeutic process to the Hamletization that Deleuze 
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and Guattari criticize, Hal’s experience is perhaps quintessential. At first, Hal 
understands the therapeutic process to be a mere formality, and, rather than resisting, 
chooses freely to participate in the appointment and the assessment that will identify him 
as pathological.  But this merely sets him up to be Hamletized, over and over. For when 
he embellishes the moment that he found his father’s body, he identifies himself to the 
therapist as duplicitous, unreadable to those around him, an assessment that he cannot 
escape.  Like Gregor in The Metamorphosis, Hal does not make a clean escape of 
anything. In this sense, the reader of Wallace’s novel is first introduced not to Hamlet, 
but to Gregor Samsa, as Hal’s ordeal appears to resemble the trials of Kafka’s 
protagonist. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, Hal’s likeness to Gregor is 
particularly figured in his encounter with the university administrators in the opening 
chapter.  The administrators go over his file, citing his excellent academic and athletic 
track records and ask him, directly, if these accomplishments are all his own.  While the 
administrators are all speaking over each other, the reader has access to Hal’s mental 
state. When left alone with the administrators, he gives an impassioned speech that ends 
with “please don’t think that I don’t care” (12). As in The Metamorphosis, Hal and 
Gregor are being subjected to two different trials. With Gregor, there is an obsession with 
his job performance—the unyielding demands, his family’s parasitic relationship to him 
and the despairing sense that he would never get out from under his current 
circumstances (Nabokov, “Franz Kafka” 261). Upon awaking as a beetle, he never seems 
to be disturbed or upset by his transformation; rather, he is concerned about the fact that 
he will be late for work, that he won’t be able to meet his professional expectations or 
support his family (Nabokov, “Franz Kafka” 264). Gregor recognizes the body of the 
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insect to be his body. He is aware that others will be disturbed by his transformation, but 
he is not himself, horrified. If anything, he expresses a sense of being inconvenienced.  
       A character cannot flee from narrative, just as a living subject cannot flee from life. 
However, the narratives of both Kafka and Wallace do demonstrate that there is a way for 
the subject to resist the powers that be. Infinite Jest is known as a book that deals 
explicitly with the themes of addiction and mental illness. However, rather than being a 
book that merely uses addiction and mental illness as a metaphor for contemporary life, 
Wallace uses figures such as the addict and the depressive to directly represent the kind 
of subjectivity generated under capitalism. To understand this approach in Wallace’s 
work, it is necessary to look at his relationship with Kafka. Wallace describes teaching 
Kafka to his students as follows:  
You can ask them to imagine his stories as all about a kind of door. To envision us 
approaching and pounding on this door, increasingly hard, pounding and pounding, 
not just wanting admission but needing it; we don’t know what it is but we can feel it, 
this total desperation to enter, pounding and ramming and kicking. That, finally, the 
door opens…and it opens outward—we’ve been inside what we wanted all along. 
(“Some Remarks”, 65) 
For Wallace, Kafka’s stories generate a psychic tension that he terms “compression” 
(“Some Remarks” 61). In other words, Kafka is a master of creating psychic tension 
within the reader. This unease is disorienting, for, as Wallace points out, Kafka does not 
offer an escape from life so much as he reminds the reader that life is inescapable. This is 
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where his comedic power truly comes into play, for there is little funnier than realizing 
that where you are, in and of itself, is where you will always be.  
     Wallace finds inspiration in Kafka’s portrayals of contemporary life, though Kafka 
does not deal explicitly with mental illness.  Kafka’s characters are put in monstrous 
circumstances that are both as despairing as they are hilarious. Within his narratives, “the 
connotation of pain accompanies…metamorphosis” but that is not entirely separate from 
the ludicrous (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 23). Kafka’s texts, I would argue, provide 
Wallace with a strategy for representing the comedic dimensions of despair, and Kafka’s 
example extends to the discourse of Wallace’s texts.  As Wallace puts it, “some of our 
most profound collective intuitions seem to be expressible only as figures of speech, and 
that’s why we call these figures of speech expressions” (“Some Remarks” 63). This is a 
key moment, for here, figures of speech are no longer mere representations—they 
become something sensory, something that cannot be separated from that which they 
express. Kafka’s ability to tap into collective enunciations has been described but it is 
worth restating its importance. As the example of The Metamorphosis and, indirectly, of 
Infinite Jest would suggest, the urgent political force of Kafka’s work is not to be found 
in the images he uses, but in the sounds that he attempts to make. The impotent clicking 
of Gregor’s mandibles and Hal’s plaintive words, swallowed by the floor, have the power 
to speak to something larger than either can fathom.  
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Chapter 3  
3. At the Gate: Addiction  
        In a revealing passage in Infinite Jest, Hal describes the etymological origins of 
addiction. He says, “the original sense of addiction involved being bound over, dedicated, 
either legally or spiritually. To devote one’s life, plunge in” (Wallace, Infinite Jest 900). 
In Hal’s account, addiction was originally connected not with disease or a personal flaw, 
but with an impulse to find meaning by being bound to something outside of the self. Hal 
continues, “we are all dying to give our lives away to something…the object [is] 
incidental to this will to give oneself away” (900). In this understanding of subjectivity, 
desire is not a hole that needs to be filled; it is productive. Meaning is not something that 
can be found in consuming something rather, it is found in the process of tying oneself to 
an external thing, in building a world around this thing. It is important to note that the 
goal here is not to complete or satisfy desire, but to create a connection to the outside 
world. As Elizabeth Freudenthal observes of Wallace’s novel, “most characters’ 
compulsive behaviors connect directly with the multinational economic and nuclear-
industrial systems at the plot’s center” (Freudenthal 195). Wallace’s figuring of addiction 
would, in this context, appear to echo Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of desire as that 
which seeks to build rather than pursue its own completion. While we have been trained 
to pursue satisfaction, it is not the actual end of desire. Desire has no end. Rather, it wants 
to build upon itself, to create more.  
         As Deleuze and Guattari point out, desire is typically understood in psychoanalytic 
theory as the lack that structures the subject (Anti-Oedipus, 41). It is the gap that is 
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required so that the contemporary subject can exist, but at the same time it is experienced 
as a distressing compulsion that cannot be permanently satisfied. In the addict, Wallace 
discovers a figure who illustrates the way in which capitalism trains the subject to 
conflate freedom with the satisfaction of desire, but who, at the same time, represents a 
more Deleuzian understanding of the relationship between the subject and desire. To the 
extent that addiction is associated with the satisfaction of desire, it is by definition 
endless.  It is simply another form, in the contemporary context, of the compulsion to 
consume that is engendered by capitalism. And even though this process of consumption 
is engendered and encouraged by capitalism, addicts are repeatedly asked to oedipalize 
themselves, in the sense that they must frame their addictions within a narrative of shame 
and must suffer guilt for possessing a desire that cannot be controlled. Thus, they take the 
blame for being the product of a system that is beyond their control. They are asked to 
abstain from the very system that creates them, as if they could somehow be anything but 
what they have been encouraged to become. 
         But Wallace’s text also proposes another reading of addiction, one that would see it 
not as an erosion of the subject, but as a form of world-building.  In this view, addiction 
creates structure, order and limits for the subject, though the limit it creates is not a set 
boundary that would constrain consumption. Rather, addiction is a way for the subject to 
bind themself to a specific thing, a principle of sorts, to structure themself under 
capitalism.  Read in this way, addiction, rather than being a weapon deployed against the 
subject, is the subject weaponizing their own desire against the system that trains it to 
consume themself. However, as Deleuze and Guattari remind us, capitalism and 




If desire is repressed, it is because every position of desire, no matter how small, is 
capable of calling into question the established order of a society: not that desire is 
asocial, on the contrary. But it is explosive; there is no desiring-machine capable of 
being assembled without demolishing entire social sectors. (Anti-Oedipus 116)  
Addicts appear, in many ways, to be well-trained consumer-capitalist subjects, in the 
sense that they channel their desire towards the specific goal of consumption; they 
attempt to consume beyond their means. Like the subject of consumer capitalism for 
whom consumption is a limitless pursuit, the desire of the addict can never be satiated, 
but the desire of the addict is most often destructive in the sense that it goes well beyond 
the limit and has no ‘end.’  However, if we consider Wallace’s account of addiction, it 
can also be thought to be potentially constructive. It is not so much that the addict could 
cause a revolution; rather, it is that consumption could be world building; the desire of 
the addict could create a burrow.  
3.1. The Addict Proper 
         Following Deleuze and Guattari, one might suggest that the addict is a figure who is 
akin to their notion of the schizophrenic, and to the figures of the depressive and the 
manic-depressive that I described earlier in this thesis. Like the schizophrenic, the addict 
weaponizes desire.  Deleuze and Guattari write that “schizophrenia is at once the wall, 
the breaking through this wall, and the failures of this breakthrough” (Anti-Oedipus 136). 
In a similar way, addiction takes the logic of consumption past its conclusion. Addiction, 
the repetition of a desire that often persists to the point of death, is not necessarily the end 
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of life. Rather, like the schizophrenic, the addict is a figure who can potentially warp the 
system that engenders them by creating a void, a lack, a burrow to create an escape. 
Through substances, the addict has access to the altered mood states of the depressive and 
manic-depressive. Euthymia, euphoria and anhedonia are all on the spectrum of emotion 
of the addict. By consuming substances, the addict is trying to achieve a high; however, 
that high can morph into an attempt to achieve a euthymia, an attempt to find emotional 
stability in the achievement of the high. Rather than a seeking after euphoria, addiction 
can be understood as an effort by the subject to preserve themselves through 
consumption. That is, euphoria is secondary to the stability achieved by consuming. In 
this sense, addiction is also world building, organizing time and space; however, like 
schizophrenia, it generates excess, it builds pressure upon the limit, and so comes to 
resemble desire in the purest sense, in that it refuses to make sense. Deleuze and Guattari 
write that “desire produces reality, or stated another way, desiring-production is one and 
the same thing as social production” (Anti-Oedipus 30). The figure of the addict is 
hyperconscious of their part in generating reality. Consuming the substance is the way in 
which the nervous system is regulated, a way to achieve equilibrium. However, it isn’t 
the kind of equilibrium that reproduces current material conditions. Rather, it is an 
equilibrium that overflows and overwhelms, that isn’t a balance at all but an attempt to 
achieve a semblance of peace by gobbling everything.  
       A more expansive view of the productive power of the excess of desire in addiction 
might suggest that it carries with it a revolutionary potential. Capitalism has trained us to 
consume, and the addict is a subject who relentlessly consumes, and indeed, is innately 
compelled to, seemingly wired or programmed to pursue a substance with a single-
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minded focus. But that single-minded compulsion, it might be argued, has the potential to 
cause the system to collapse in upon itself. It is not that addiction is the path to freedom, 
but rather that addiction presents a different approach to the question of repression. For, 
rather than freeing oneself from repression, the addict appears to sink their hooks into it, 
doubling down on repression by consuming a substance to keep them in a stasis. 
However, one might argue that in this overcompensation the addict creates an opening for 
a different mode of subjectivity. This speaks to Deleuze and Guattari’s point, that “the 
problem is not that of being free but finding a way out, or even a way in, another side, a 
hallway, an adjacency” (Kafka 7-8). To be clear, this not an argument for transcendence 
but rather, an assertion that material conditions and the way that subjects move within the 
social field could be different.   
          The addict appears to be an unlikely hero, and indeed, they are not a hero at all. 
The addict is resolutely who they are, startlingly themselves, a louse in human form with 
no false heroics or hidden agendas and nowhere to go. But as Wallace points out, Kafka 
shows us that “our endless and impossible journey toward home is in fact our home” 
(“Some Remarks” 64-65). And if Deleuze and Guattari are right to claim “where one 
believed there was the law, there is in fact desire and desire alone” then we might well 
suggest that the addict, rather than a hero, is in fact a legislator, a kind of lawmaker in 
capitalism (Kafka 49). Addicts are those who cannot stop consuming, who are all 
appetite. Their revolutionary potential, if we want to call it that, lies in the state of flux in 
which the addict resides: “consumptions are transitions, processes of becoming, and 
returns” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 42). Addiction is a state of becoming, in the 
sense that it is a productive process without a fixed end. That addiction, or the obsessive 
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and repetitive fixation upon consuming, is compatible with capitalism is well known. 
However, addiction goes beyond consumption. It has the capacity to order affects and 
create worlds. It is a consumptive process that works by organizing. Deleuze and Guattari 
write that “desire does not take as its object persons or things, but the entire surroundings 
it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined, introducing 
therein breaks and captures” (Anti-Oedipus 292). In the very terms they suggest, the 
addict is a figure who shapes their political horizons through the force of their desire. 
Their desire is the kind that legislates, that organizes and stabilizes.  The addict grows 
and grows, until, unable to be sated, they collapse or explode, taking a piece of the 
system with them.   
3.2. Addiction as Bad Thinking 
        However, this is not the only discourse of the addict that operates in Infinite Jest.  
Wallace also writes about addiction as if it were a failure in logic, a bad way of thinking. 
His narrator suggests, for example, that “the most Substance-addicted people are also 
addicted to thinking, meaning they have a compulsive and unhealthy relationship with 
their own thinking” (Infinite Jest 203). Conceptualized this way, the addict is reduced to a 
maladaptive, someone with faulty wiring. In this perspective, the addict is effectively 
“Hamletized,” which hobbles any revolutionary potential by reducing addiction to an 
error in thinking. Freudenthal describes one of the “emotional draws of Infinite Jest [to 
be] its portrayal of interior-focused, rational, self-conscious intellectuality as emotionally 
debilitating” (Freudenthal 195). However, to reduce addiction to an error in thinking 
overlooks the system that engenders the isolation and solipsism that Wallace portrays in a 
character like Hal. I would even go so far as to say that it appears that Wallace, at some 
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points in the text, chooses to disregard the systems that engender the addict or treats the 
addict as if their subjectivity could be separated from the system that forms it. It is an 
oversight on Wallace’s part on par with Kafka’s failure to understand that Gregor had 
transformed into a beetle who could have flown away: “a domed beetle, a scarab beetle 
with wing-sheaths, and neither Gregor nor his maker realized that when the room was 
being made by the maid, and the window was open, he could have flown out and escaped 
and joined the other happy dung beetles rolling the dung balls on rural paths” (Nabokov, 
Strong Opinions 90-91). Reducing the addict to a subject who thinks too much, who is 
addicted to their own thinking, further interiorizes a problem that is caused by material 
conditions.  In effect, the subject is being blamed for the very conditions that shape them, 
which is at odds with the abundant evidence that addiction is powerfully informed by 
various socio-economic factors. Furthermore, in posing addiction as a problem in 
thinking, a fault in logic, it is easy to ignore the apparently inexplicable compulsion to 
consume. Addiction is productive, but it is not conscious. While the figure of the addict is 
self-aware, that is not the doing of their addiction. Rather, it is in spite of it.  
       These two dissonant discourses at work in the novel are, in many ways, 
irreconcilable. If addiction is the result of a particular economic system, then no matter 
how many times the addict tries to ‘change’ their thinking, that system will still exist. 
Earlier in this chapter, I reviewed Wallace’s etymology of addiction, which includes the 
sense that addiction functions as a way to solve the problem of “I cannot get out, I cannot 
get out” (Sterne qtd. in Nabokov, “Franz Kafka”, 254).  In other words, addiction is the 
subject’s response to living within a set of material conditions that are inescapable. But in 
thinking of addiction as a problem in logic, Wallace implies that the addict’s logic, rather 
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than the system that necessitates that logic, is the problem, as if solipsism is the cause, 
rather than an effect of addiction, or as if the addict need only redirect their thinking 
away from themselves and towards those around them. This is what has led to the 
veneration of Don Gately as a heroic figure in the novel, a former addict who chooses to 
live through the pain of a gunshot wound without any pain killers (Baskin 45). Numerous 
critics dwell upon the Alcoholics Anonymous portions of Infinite Jest as evidence of 
Wallace attempting to guide the reader away from the existential despair engendered by 
living in millennial America (Baskin 63-65). However, this quest for an alternative way 
of living is misguided because, as the novel suggests, the addict will still be ensnared 
within the system that created them in the first place. Perhaps, a more nuanced way of 
regarding this impulse towards moralizing in the novel, represented by the narrator’s 
interest in setting the addict back on the path of the straight and narrow, is to read it as an 
impulse towards reterritorialization. Deleuze and Guattari identified this impulse as an 
inevitable feature of American literature: “the destiny of American literature [is] that of 
crossing limits and frontiers, causing deterritorialized flows of desire to circulate, but also 
always making these flows transport fascisizing, moralizing, Puritan and familialist 
territorialities” (Anti-Oedipus 277-278). As I said earlier in this thesis, the impulse to 
reterritorialize is always present where deterritorialization occurs. While this is not 
necessarily unique to American literature, what makes it particularly evident in Infinite 
Jest is that there are twin compulsions. The first is, as I have just said, to locate the 
origins of addiction in the way that the subject thinks. The second, and I believe more 
interesting of the two, is to look at how the various circuits of capital, therapeutic regimes 
and entertainment work to ensnare the subject in its own desire. As has been said, in 
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many ways, these two impulses are irreconcilable, but they are also, in the novel, 
mutually constitutive. The former cannot exist without the latter, because the addict and 
their ‘bad thinking’ cannot occur without the system that makes the logic of addiction 
sensible. In the same vein, the system, or multiple systems, as they are currently 
arranged, cannot exist without creating the subject who thinks this way. In this way, 
while the impulse to reterritorialize becomes inevitable in Wallace’s fiction, the novel 
also suggests that it is important to resist the impulse to rehab the addict, for they occupy 
a position in the social field that makes resistance possible.  
         Of all the insipid things written about Infinite Jest, the least interesting are those 
that present Wallace as a saint who intends to show readers the correct path. As Adam 
Kelly observes, there is an “implicit agreement among...many critics with Wallace’s 
professed premise that fiction should act as both “diagnosis and cure,” that it should be 
viewed not primarily in terms of aesthetic representation, but of ethical intervention” 
(Kelly, “David Foster Wallace” 51). Many scholars turn to the sections of Infinite Jest 
that take place in Alcoholics Anonymous to argue that the addict needs to be cured 
through rebinding themselves to the Higher Power of Alcoholics Anonymous. However, 
there is a dearth of scholarship that questions the function of AA within the novel. By 
forcing the addict to go through their childhood, to admit that they have a “Disease/-
ease”, they become the locus of destruction when the system itself is the source of rot 
(Wallace, Infinite Jest 205). To think of AA as curative, as if there is a cure able to repair 
the system that generates the addict, fundamentally misunderstands addiction. 
Rehabilitation does not mean that the addict is fixed or is living a decent life; it means 
that they have been brought in line.  
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        There are scholars who argue that Wallace wants to make his readers better (Baskin 
12). In Wallace’s own words, “fiction’s about what it means to be a fucking human 
being,” so he sought some sort of connection to the reader (Wallace qtd. in McCaffery, 
26). Admittedly, there is a tendency in Infinite Jest to argue that sobriety is better, that it 
is even transcendent. In this sense, Don Gately is represented as a throwback to a 
nineteenth century hero rather than a way forward. However, considered in terms of the 
novel’s broader construction of and reflection upon the figure of the addict, one might 
argue instead that in venerating Gately, one is asserting that subjects created by a system 
should rehabilitate themselves so that they can better serve that system. Desire doesn’t go 
anywhere. The novel suggests that the resistance the addict generates is destroyed when 
they are rehabilitated back into the system. They are reintegrated into the game of desire 
in which we all find ourselves. In this respect, there is no getting better in Infinite Jest, 
merely a return to the same. It is all a lateral move. Recall that Wallace’s novel takes 
place in a dystopia, where America has integrated Canada and Mexico into the 
Organization of North American Nations, and the system itself, the homeostasis that is 
being reached for, is rotten. In this context, the impulse to moralize over the issue of 
addiction only reveals an apparently irreconcilable conflict in the text between 
understanding the subject as a figure generated by a confluence of forces outside of its 
control and seeing that figure as self-directed, with the agency to act productively. Rather 
than considering the possibility of agency under consumer capitalism, a significant 
amount of time is spent moralizing over the addict, pointing out how they are in the 
wrong when they are generated by something greater than themselves.  
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3.3. A Book with No Point 
        Infinite Jest is not just a book with an empty center. It is a novel about the 
circulation of nothingness itself. There is, of course, the pretext of a tape in the novel 
called Infinite Jest, described as “lethally entertaining” (Wallace, Infinite Jest 788). Its 
whereabouts are presented to the reader as a mystery that needs to be solved, but its exact 
location is never confirmed. We know that all those who watch the tape are rendered 
infantile, their desire for entertainment sated and presumably, obliterated. The contents of 
the video are a very straightforward critique of the theatre of the family within 
psychoanalysis:  
It features Madame Psychosis as some kind of maternal instantiation of the 
archetypal figure Death, sitting naked, corporeally gorgeous, ravishing, hugely 
pregnant...explaining in very simple childlike language to whomever the film’s 
camera represents that Death is always female. (Infinite Jest 788)  
Wallace finishes this thought by writing, “the woman who kills you is always your next 
life’s mother” (788). The figure of the mother who harms her child through her love, or 
rather, her inability to love her child the right way, is a common trope in psychoanalysis.  
In most psychoanalytic theory, the realization of one’s own subjectivity and the existence 
of desire occurs when one understands that they and their mother are ultimately two 
different entities rather than an undifferentiated whole. In this way, the mother 
supposedly creates a lack in her absence, leaving a split, a tear, that can never be truly 
repaired.  As I have suggested, the theatre of the family is central to psychiatric 
discourses, including psychoanalysis; in Infinite Jest, this theatre of the family plays out 
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on an actual tape, which appears to have been created with the express purpose of 
supplementing a ‘lost’ or presumed memory of an archetypal mother. This is, in some 
ways, a joke. However, it should not be ignored that the film still presents the mother as a 
kind of monster, for in giving life she is also condemning the subject to death.  
       According to the wraith of J.O Incandenza, the creator of the film and the father of 
Hal, he wanted to create a tape “[Hal] would love enough to induce him to open his 
mouth and come out” (Wallace, Infinite Jest 839). He was hoping to use entertainment to 
save his son from “the womb of solipsism, anhedonia, death in life” (839). In his own 
words, it was meant to be an apology: “I AM SO VERY, VERY SORRY” (839). This 
further substantiates the dual impulses of the tape. On one hand, there is a fairly obvious 
joke about psychoanalysis and its fixation on the family; on the other hand, in 
Incandenza’s decision to recreate an Oedipal fantasy and the tape’s ability to neutralize 
desire, there is the suggestion that the family and particularly parents are culpable in the 
mental and emotional distress of their children.  However, in the novel, the actual quality 
of the tape, widely considered a failure, is up for debate. Those who watch it are 
reportedly not liberated but rendered infantile. Hal never actually sees the tape, and 
Madame Psychosis, the star of the film, has “a hard time believing it was even 
entertaining, let alone lethally entertaining” (789).  While it is important to the structure 
of the narrative, the investigation into the tape ultimately goes nowhere. It is forever 
stalled, left incomplete, like an aborted mystery novel. 
      However, to ask this question of ‘where’ or ‘what’ is to miss the point of the tape. 
That is, there is no point, and the existence of the tape is simply part of the endless series 
of cycles within the novel: the brutal training regimens, the ritual of praying to a Higher 
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Power. There is always a not-yet, something on the horizon that is always put off, that 
can never be achieved. Deleuze and Guattari write that “capitalism…liberates the flows 
of desire, but under the social conditions that define its limit and the possibility of its own 
dissolution, so that it is constantly opposing with all its exasperated strength the 
movement that drives it toward this limit” (Anti-Oedipus 139-140).  The endless 
circulations in Wallace’s novel mimic these flows, cycles that exist merely to sustain 
themselves.  
       The circulatory structure of the novel also mimics the multiplicity of capitalism 
itself. Todd McGowan observes, “capitalism is such a variable system that we cannot 
speak of a single system” (McGowan 19). It is a system that is made of many different 
parts and circuits. The dystopia of Infinite Jest is built on this system of endless flows and 
circulations, which is also the novel’s inescapable horizon. This is not an uncommon 
motif in postmodern literature. Philip Nel writes, “if [postmodernism] delivers a critique 
of conspicuous consumption, it also endorses the desire to consume; if its nonsensical 
logic challenges the present rationality of accepted social structures, its reliance on 
stereotypes reinforces those same systems of power” (Nel, Avant-Garde, 76). As I earlier 
observed, one of the more dystopic elements in Infinite Jest is that time itself is 
subsidized, so that the majority of the events in the novel take place in the “Year of the 
Depend Adult Undergarment” (Wallace, Infinite Jest 17). As Wallace explains in an 
interview, “the world that I live in consists of 250 advertisements a day and any number 
of unbelievably entertaining options, most of which are subsidized by corporations that 
want to sell me things” (Wallace qtd. in Miller, 60). In Infinite Jest, this notion is 
expanded so that time itself is subject to the circulation of consumption, and so it is 
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perhaps not surprising that in Wallace’s narrative, addiction is just another way that these 
circulations of consumption move through the subject, and indeed, use them as a 
flashpoint.  But while addiction in Infinite Jest is ultimately world building, that 
constructive model is not the generative principle for the novel. In Wallace’s text, time is 
structured by advertising; there are infinite opportunities to consume and endless regimes 
and rituals, all illustrative of the novel’s insistence upon empty circulation. Everything is 
in perpetual motion, yet there is no point, just as there is no point beyond mere existence 
to capitalism.   
3.4. Circulation as Motif 
      In Capitalist Realism, Mark Fisher argues that there are no clear ‘aesthetics’ of 
capitalism, so much as capitalism will appropriate whatever it can to conceal itself. He 
writes “the role of capitalist ideology is not to make an explicit case for something in the 
way that propaganda does, but to conceal the fact that the operations of capital do not 
depend on any sort of subjectively assumed belief” (Realism 12-13). For Fisher, 
capitalism hides itself in plain sight, in the sense that it does not rely on propaganda or a 
specific rhetoric or aesthetic discourse. Rather, it presents itself as both apparent and 
inevitable. The apparent and inevitable are figured in Wallace’s novel in conjunction with 
its emphasis on circulation and mere existence.  For example, the plot of the novel is 
constructed so that the beginning of the narrative presents what is chronologically the end 
of plot, so that the narrative appears to move in a circle.  In addition, the sheer profusion 
of events and characters in the text, often in situations without resolution or that have 
little relation one to another, presents a world that is teeming with motion and 
multiplicity but to no end. In Wallace’s novel, perpetual motion is the ‘point’ of 
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capitalism; the system must always be on the move and cannot function otherwise. 
Moreover, to the extent that time, for example, appears to be a function of capitalist 
circulation, the text would appear to suggest that capitalism has, in some way, always 
haunted the social field. In this sense, Infinite Jest can be seen to echo Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assertion that “capitalism [is] a kind of dark potentiality which haunted all 
previous social systems” (Fisher, Realism 5).  While capitalism is not timeless, in the 
sense that it is not a transhistorical structure, Fisher argues that the despotism that it 
engenders has always been on the fringes of previous social systems. Within the text of 
Infinite Jest, Wallace uses different cycles, most notably time and narrative, to articulate 
this omnipresence of capitalism.  
       Time also plays a role in the profusion of short, isolated narratives within the larger 
discourse of Infinite Jest. There are several characters who only appear once in the novel, 
not to move the plot forward but to provide a testimony, their own story; their narratives 
typically go nowhere, but they are nonetheless part of the circulatory and circular 
discourse of the larger text. A particularly memorable instance of this occurs when a 
young woman stands up at an AA meeting and recounts the cause of her addiction.  She 
is a “skinny hard-faced Advanced Basics girl who...posits that she was an eight-bag-a-
day dope fiend because at sixteen she’d had to become a stripper and semi-
whore...because she’d had to run away from her foster home (Wallace, Infinite Jest 370).  
The other members at the meeting are uncomfortable with the woman blaming her 
addiction on a trauma, presumably since most people in attendance have been 
traumatized in some way, and because her trauma is sexually violent in nature. As a 
teenager, she shared a room with her disabled foster sister, who was being sexually 
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abused by the woman’s foster father, who was the foster sister’s biological father (371). 
Before he assaulted his daughter, he placed a Raquel Welch mask over her face, 
suggesting that his own daughter was a means through which he could realize a near 
impossible fantasy (371). The woman cleaned up after her foster father, who would leave 
his daughter with the mask on, her legs apart (372). However, the true horrific moment, 
the one that pushes her over the edge, is when she looks over and sees that her foster 
sister is taking pleasure from these assaults. Her face had a “sort of pinched gasping look 
of neurologic concentration that marks a carnal bliss beyond smiles or sighs” (373). This 
realization, the woman claims, forced her to leave her foster home and become a sex 
worker to survive and a drug addict to cope with the psychic pain.  
        The woman’s story is upsetting for others at the meeting because no one asks her to 
say what happened, and the “subcurrent of explanation, an appeal to exterior Cause that 
can slide, in the addictive mind, so insidiously into Excuse that any causal attribution 
is...feared, shunned. Punished by empathic distress” (Wallace, Infinite Jest 374). She does 
not simply tell the story that she believes everyone wants to hear. This is the story 
through which she comes to understand herself and her world. She has the chance to be 
‘honest’ with herself, as if it has the power to begin the healing process inside of her. By 
reducing her addiction to her trauma, the addict hopes to receive sympathy for becoming 
who she is. In framing her addiction as the logical response to a traumatic moment, she 
does not look at her role as an agent in her addiction, which is precisely what makes her 
testimony so uncomfortable for the other members of AA.    
          In the story of the Raquel Welch mask, Wallace presents a figure who is trying to 
use a singular, traumatic event to make sense of her entire life. The way that she 
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constructs her own narrative illustrates how both time and addiction figure as 
circulations. Everything can always be tied back to something that is in the past but 
cannot be left behind. In framing her addiction as the logical outcome of a singular 
trauma, not only does the addict claim passivity, but in claiming that addiction is the 
result of trauma, that it has a causation that is located within childhood experience or the 
theatre of the family, the young woman, unwittingly, directs our attention away from the 
larger systems that cause it. As was stated earlier in this chapter by Fisher, this 
redirection is typical of the aesthetics that are produced under capitalism. Everything, 
including time, is malleable. It can be shaped, looped, circuited in such a way that it feels 
as if there is no way out. Through this redirection, the system remains unquestioned, the 
addict is disoriented and pinned down. The addict is the subject generated by a system 
with an empty centre, that weaponizes the story of the family to hide what it is in plain 
sight. The addict is the centre, in the sense that the centre, the point, is to keep moving, 
desiring. Deleuze and Guattari write that “the order of desire is the order of production; 
all production is at once desiring-production and social production” (Anti-Oedipus 296). 
The unconscious does not produce representations, and it does not move according to a 
narrative or a story. Generally speaking, representation is a by-product of desiring-
production. This representation, the centre, the point, the very figuration of the addict is 
the circulation of desire. 
3.5. The Hamletizing of Hal 
        In the first chapter, and throughout the book, Hal is regularly Hamletized and 
oedipalized. While I compared him to Gregor Samsa earlier in the thesis, I think it is 
valuable now to look at the way that Hal is both constructed from Hamlet and Hamletized 
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within the novel. There are numerous references to Shakespeare’s Hamlet in the novel, 
but Hal is not merely an echo of Shakespeare’s tragic hero. Hamlet’s dead father wanted 
to be avenged, calling out: “let not the royal bed of Denmark be/A couch for luxury and 
damned incest,” but, as I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, the ghost of Hal’s father 
says only that he wanted to create the tape Infinite Jest to lure his son outside of himself, 
to prevent him from retreating into solipsism (Shakespeare 1.5.82-83; Wallace, Infinite 
Jest 839). In fact, in the creation of the tape, Incandenza does the opposite of the ghost’s 
condemnation of gluttony. Incandenza looks to indulgence in order to create a tape that 
would move Hal to speak. He believes that this will save Hal, bringing him outside of 
himself in order to defeat the solipsism engendered by a society that hinges upon 
individual consumption. In Wallace’s novel, Hal’s affiliation with Hamlet and the oedipal 
subject signals merely the extent to which he is ensnared in a trap from which there is no 
escape. As Wallace remarks apropos of Kafka, subjectivity is inescapable. You are 
always already who you are. Wallace writes: “it’s not that students don’t get Kafka’s 
humor but that we’ve taught them to see humour as something you get—the same way 
we’ve taught them that a self is something you just have” (“Some Remarks” 64). This 
ensnarement is inevitable, and the hilarity in Wallace, as in Kafka, is in this incredible 
lack of self-awareness in the struggle to understand that one is simply who they are. One 
does not get a self or achieve subjectivity or enlightenment or insight. One is a subject.  
       Rather than stumbling upon his father’s ghost, Hal stumbles upon his father’s dead 
body, after he killed himself via microwave: “found by one Harold James Incandenza, 
thirteen going on really old” (Wallace, Infinite Jest 248). Although I have already 
discussed this earlier in this thesis, I would like to go into more detail, as it is a 
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particularly illuminating section of the novel. Taken out of his training for “concentrated 
grief- and trauma-therapy," Hal realizes that the only way to return to his regular regime 
is to lie about having a therapeutic breakthrough (252). Encouraged by his trauma 
counsellor, Hal Hamletizes himself, making a false and exaggerated confession of 
trauma, claiming that, before discovering his father’s body, he thought “that something 
smelled delicious” (256). This is, obviously, a joke. However, the therapist takes Hal at 
his word and, on the basis of simply having recognized his trauma, okays his return to the 
field, with little or no therapeutic support: “I’d finally delivered the goods and my 
traumatic grief was professionally pronounced uncovered and countenanced and 
processed” (257). Rather than feigning madness, Hal pretends to have a breakthrough that 
allows him to return to his normal routine. In an illuminating observation about the figure 
of Hamlet, Hal remarks: “it’s always seemed a little preposterous that Hamlet, for all his 
paralyzing doubt about everything, never once doubts the reality of the ghost. Never 
questions whether his own madness might not in fact be unfeigned” (900). Hal questions 
the entire premise of not just the play, but Hamlet’s sanity from the outset. In other 
words, Hal implies that Hamlet’s intellect masqueraded as sanity, similar to the way that 
depression presents itself as a sane, logical and objective view of the world. The fixation 
on the intellect of Hamlet is revealing for two reasons. First, Hal is obviously thinking 
about himself, suspecting that his own intellect is the enemy, and second, Hal reveals that 
he is unable to integrate his rational and emotional worlds. In other words, his ability to 




      This is important, because Hal’s actual drug use is not triggered by trauma, but rather, 
by the creeping sense of anhedonia that his father foresaw coming for him. In other 
words, there is no rational reason why Hal begins using cannabis. Wallace writes: “like 
most North Americans of his generation, Hal tends to know way less about why he feels 
certain ways about the objects and pursuits he’s devoted to than he does about the objects 
and pursuits themselves” (Infinite Jest 54). It was not an intellectual response to a 
stimulus, but an unconscious action that is directly tied to having feelings that are 
overwhelming and beyond comprehension.  On this point, Wallace writes “who [hasn’t], 
at some life-stage, in the U.S.A. and Interdependent regions, in these troubled times” 
indulged in some sort of substances or another (53). Though Wallace writes that there is 
an intellectual function to anhedonia, it is not the logic of anhedonia that is devastating; 
rather, it is the emotional impact of anhedonia that does the damage. As de Sutter writes, 
“anaesthesia [is] the ablation of the relationship between a subject and their sensations, 
and the elimination of their enjoyment” (de Sutter 15). Rather than getting high to feel 
good, Hal gets high to numb out the emptiness of feeling nothing. This is a crucial piece 
of information for our understanding of Wallace’s representation of the addict. Addiction 
doesn’t seek any one affect—some people want to be numb; others want euphoria; 
addiction is a process of ordering and achieving an affective response, but it would be a 
mistake to assume that everyone is looking for the same one.   
     The relationship between addiction and anhedonia takes place within the subject. 
However, as with any discussion of the subject, there is a political dimension to this 
relationship. As a desiring subject, the addict appears to clash with anhedonia, and the 
clash between them is essential for any understanding of the conflict that Wallace tries to 
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navigate in Infinite Jest.  The source of that conflict can be found in the tension between 
the desiring addict and the anhedonia that dominates the social field. As I have indicated, 
addiction is a productive, world-building response to the flattening, monotonous 
emotional world of anhedonia. One may wonder why the addict even bothers, but it 
should be obvious: these two forces are different responses that emerge from the social 
field shaped by capitalism. McGowan writes “the capitalist subject constantly 
experiences its failure to belong, which is why the recurring fantasy within capitalism is 
that of attaining some degree of authentic belonging” (McGowan 20). The addict creates 
a world in which they belong, and in this sense, there is an agency in addiction that is a 
direct response to anhedonia.  I use the word agency because, in a world generated by 
consumption, the choice of how and what to consume is one of the few choices one has. 
While the social field is generated by forces beyond the control of the subject, and 
indeed, the subject is always already enmeshed within this field, there is some agency to 
be found, some different way of traversing the plane of immanence. It is a matter of 
looking.  
      In some ways, it may simply appear dated to advocate for desire as having 
revolutionary potential. Living under consumer capitalism, which consolidates so much 
of its power in stoking desire, the idea that desire, in and of itself, could have subversive 
let alone revolutionary potential can seem laughable. However, it cannot be ignored that 
“desire does not “want” revolution, it is revolutionary, as though involuntarily, by 
wanting what it wants” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 116). One of the main 
arguments in this thesis is that desire is not just what we recognize it to be; it can take 
different forms. Its wanting is not for fulfilment, and according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
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to see desire as a lack is to fundamentally misunderstand how the subject negotiates with 
the forces that act upon them. If desire is truly a lack that needs to be filled, that would 
mean, according to Deleuze and Guattari, that there is no hope for the possibility of 
human agency. While they argue that the subject is undoubtedly shaped by a multiplicity 
of forces outside of its control, by virtue of desire and its productivity, change is possible. 
In other words, human agency is a productive act, even though civil society seemingly 
does everything to obfuscate this truth.  As Deleuze observes of meanness, “society 
constantly puts us in situations where it is in our best interest to be mean. Our vanity 
would have us believe that we are naturally mean. But the truth is much worse: we 
become mean without knowing it, without even realizing it” (Deserts 53). Anti-Oedipus 
is, arguably, built upon this claim. As I remarked at the beginning of the second chapter, 
meanness is a product of social conditions, and as such, is not an innate, human quality. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of agency as a fundamentally productive act is 
critical to this point. While meanness is practically encouraged by all the material aspects 
of Western society, it is not an inevitability. It is possible for the subject to act differently, 
in accordance with the world in which they want to live, the world which they will build 
through their actions. In this sense, the addict is a model for creating the world in which 
one wants to live; it isn’t necessarily a better one, but it could be, and that potential is the 





      The structure of this thesis has been described as a triptych. Rather than present a 
linear argument, the three chapters work together as a ‘set’ of texts that provide distinct 
vantage points from which to study the therapeutic regimes of psychoanalysis and 
psychiatric power, and the lived experience of consumer capitalism. All the objects I 
have considered, from the figures of madness to the forces of addiction and anhedonia, 
work together to shape contemporary subjectivity. The first chapter presented a 
genealogy of contemporary figures of madness in order to argue that there was a political 
dimension to the categorization of madness that arose in the nineteenth century, and that 
the challenge of madness was systematically negated or harnessed through multiple 
discourses and regimes, particularly psychoanalysis and capitalism. In the second 
chapter, I narrowed my focus by employing Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of minor 
literature to explore the relationship between Kafka and Wallace, as well as the 
possibilities for resistance that are unique to the figure of the addict. In the final chapter, I 
argued that the figure of the addict is constructed from a multiplicity of circulations, and 
that addiction, in and of itself, is a kind of circulation, a method of appropriating the 
flows of capitalism and the forces that are weaponized against the subject.  
     There are both utopian and anti-humanist impulses within this thesis.  Following 
Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari, I have echoed the anti-humanist argument that the 
subject, shaped by discursive forces outside its control, appears to have little agency.  I 
have also been particularly critical of the roles of psychoanalysis and psychiatry in 
actively undermining any potential agency in madness.  Psychoanalysis and psychiatry 
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project upon madness in order to neutralize it, and their work upon symptoms deflects 
attention away from the larger system of which those symptoms are effects. As Deleuze 
remarks of the grounds for his engagement with psychiatry and psychoanalysis, “I would 
never have allowed myself to talk about psychoanalysis and psychiatry if this were not a 
question of symptomology. [It] is located almost outside of medicine, at a neutral point, 
where artists and philosophers and doctors and patients come together” (Deserts 134).  
The social field is made up of multiplicities, and it is worth considering what it means to 
live in a society where the subject is punished for its inability to maintain sanity in a 
system that may not be entirely sane.  As long as psychoanalysis and psychiatry treat only 
the symptoms of the subject and ignore their relation to the systems that engender 
madness, then madness will always be negated or neutralized.  
     As Deleuze and Guattari assert in Anti-Oedipus, “the madness of our patients is an 
artifact of the destruction wreaked on them by us and by them on themselves” (Anti-
Oedipus 132). It is important to note that Deleuze and Guattari include “us” in their 
indictment. We cause destruction and harm; the system is despotic, yes, but it could not 
cause the harm that it does without its agents.  Consider, for example, as Wallace does, 
the authority figures, bureaucrats, clerks and prison guards in Kafka. Wallace writes that 
“Kafka’s authority figures are never just hollow buffoons to be ridiculed, but are always 
absurd and scary and sad all at once” (“Remarks on Kafka” 63). The petty agents of 
despotism in Kafka’s work enact its will in the everyday unfolding of the world without 
even blinking an eye, and with a thoughtlessness that is both absurd and terrifying.  
      On the utopian side, I have argued in this thesis that desire is the grounds for human 
agency, though we can never say what the intention of the revolutionary potential of 
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desire is. One of the central claims of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is that desire, 
by virtue of its unpredictability and libidinal structure, is inherently productive and 
therefore, could be a means through which capitalism might be resisted. While the terms 
‘revolution’ and ‘resistance’ remain vague in their account, they nonetheless assert that 
agency is a fundamentally productive act; it creates, manufactures, and assembles. While 
we are inevitably caught up in a system that pins us down on all sides, agency is still 
possible—that is why the repression enacted by capitalism and enforced by 
psychoanalysis is as crushing as it is. In other words, though we may live in a culture that 
is shaped around consumption and repression, in which the subject is pinned down by the 
very discursive forces that construct it, such as psychiatric power, agency is still possible.  
      This line of argumentation, I would argue, opens the door to a possible counter 
discourse.  There is, for example, the possibility of looking to literature as an anti-
therapeutic discourse.  Wallace scholarship, for its part, has been more comfortable with 
suggesting that Wallace wants to offer a therapy, a connection of sorts, to his reader: 
“[Infinite Jest’s] real ‘difficulty’ lies…in…what it endeavors to get its readers to see” 
(Baskin, 41). However, ascribing this kind of intentionality is problematic, as Wallace’s 
novel itself would appear to suggest through the example of J.O. Incandenza, who, in 
trying to create a tape to bring his son out of his shell, ended up doing the opposite.  What 
Wallace’s novel ultimately suggests is that if there is any value to be found in literature as 
a therapeutic response, it must reside in its capacity to work against discourses that 
encourage normalization. In this sense, it would be more appropriate to think of literature 
as a potential anti-therapeutic discourse. For, if there is anything to be learned from 
Infinite Jest, it is that while the book is not therapeutic, or at least not in a way that we 
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would recognize, it still speaks to the symptomology that Deleuze and Guattari identify in 
the social field. In this vein, as Deleuze correctly argues, “the artist is not outside 
symptoms, but makes a work of art of them, which sometimes serves to precipitate them, 
and sometimes to transform them” (Deserts 140). Rather than simply ‘treating’ 
symptoms, literature offers the possibility of engaging with madness, bringing it into a 
discourse that does not negate it. This is not to say that madness leads to great art. Rather, 
it is that literature is a discourse that can offer resistance by allowing madness its 
productive potential, its agency. 
       I embarked on this thesis because I was looking for a trap door. I was not satisfied 
with the notion we find in Infinite Jest that addiction is a subjective failing, particularly 
when we recognize that the subject is constructed by a system that almost guarantees that 
they become who they are. Kafka’s “A Little Fable” sums up the situation quite well:  
“Alas,” said the mouse, “the world is growing smaller every day. At the beginning 
it was so big that I was afraid, I kept running and running, and I was glad when at 
last I saw walls far away to the right and the left, but these long walls have 
narrowed so quickly that I am in the last chamber already, and there in the corner 
stands the trap that I must run into.” “You only need to change your direction,” 
said the cat, and ate it up. (Short Stories, 445) 
The mouse has no choice but to be gobbled up, to enter the belly of the beast and be 
chewed up and consumed. However, I think that this can be interpreted a little differently. 
I don’t think this story necessarily has to be devastating or depressing. Frightening, yes. 
But this story does not represent an inevitable foreclosure. Note that it is the cat, the 
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second trap, who tells the mouse that the only escape is by changing direction; not only 
does the trap speak, but it advises the mouse that there are two ways to act in the present 
situation. The mouse was always already trapped, before the cat appeared, because the 
mouse was always trying to find the trap so as to avoid it. The mouse was already in a 
state of flight, and as such, could not realize the extent to which it was participating in its 
own ensnarement.  
      For, in moments of despair, of which there are many in this world, and at times when 
one correctly ascertains that there is nowhere to go, the subject may find agency in the 
fact that there is no other choice but to change direction. While there may only be one 
choice presented, it is still a choice, and there is agency in turning around and realizing 
where one truly is, instead of trying to flee. Agency does not mean that one is able to 
escape ensnarement. Rather, it changes the relationship between the subject and the trap. 
For if one can stop struggling, they will be able to find, if not a way out, a chance to 
resist.  
      There is also a third line of flight, hinted at by the cat. If the mouse had stopped 
focusing on finding the trap, it most likely could have seen the cat come stalking up 
behind it. If the mouse had stopped and thought about why it was running, why it was 
afraid, it is entirely possible that the story could have ended differently. In other words, 
my response to the question of agency under consumer capitalism, under the therapeutic 
regimes of psychiatric power and psychoanalysis, is not that the subject can only resign 
itself to the inevitable; in order to understand the trap, our location in it, there must be an 
acknowledgement that we are stuck in a network of relations that are prior to our 
existence. We must stop and locate ourselves, and then look for another direction. No 
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matter how these traps and predators present themselves, they are not transhistorical nor 
are they absolute givens. If the subject regards life as an exercise in avoiding traps, then 
they are already ensnared. Agency is not only possible, but an imperative.  Do with that 
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